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ABSTRACT 
A companson of state tax sources reflects different tax systems including 
differing mixes and levels of taxes, different tax bases and varying rate structures among 
the fifty states. Five states do not impose general sales taxes while six collect more than 
50% of tax revenue from this source; nine states do not impose broad-based personal 
income tax while four collect more than 50% of tax revenue from this source. These 
patterns suggest several questions including: Why do states rely on some taxes more than 
others, how do states decide on the mix and magnitude of tax revenues and what factors 
influence tax structure decisions? 
The purpose of this research 1s to examme the factors determining the 
composition of tax revenues across the fifty states between 1979-1999. The focus is on 
the three major tax sources: general sales, personal and corporate income taxes. The 
research is an empirical investigation of the tax shares and how policy preferences, 
economic shifts, continuous voter support and competitive pressures influence them 
across the states. The analysis is designed to consider how three broad influences affect 
marginal decisions on the use of these tax instruments. First, policymakers consider the 
preferences of interest groups, (income earners, retailers and businesses) in choosing 
between the major tax instruments. Second, they consider the state's industrial mix and 
how revenues will respond to the level of economic activity located within their 
jurisdictions. Finally, policymakers consider tax competition, made easier by cross-
border shopping and the rise of electronic commerce, when setting their tax structure. 
The study takes an initial step toward filling a lack of comprehensive 
characterization of the tax revenue composition of the fifty states. The empirical results 
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uncover unique responses of tax portfolios to economic, political and tax competition 
developments. These three aspects of tax revenue portfolios affect the balance of state 
tax revenue and produce widespread state budget shortfalls. State policymakers can 
utilize the findings of this study when analyzing their tax revenue compositions. The 
current study can serve in finding a better solution to states' budget problems. The 
provided results could help evaluate the reliance on particular tax source and develop 
new tactics that enable state policymakers to meet their budget needs. 
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1.1 Overview of Issues 
In the last several decades, state governments have become highly dependent on 
their own revenue sources. In 1979, about fifty percent of all states' general revenue was 
provided by state taxes, while in 1999, seventy-six percent of states' general revenue 
came from tax revenue. The remaining fifty and twenty-four percent came from 
intergovernmental aid. A careful look at state tax revenue composition reflects different 
tax systems and various mixes and levels of taxes, different tax bases and rate structures 
among the fifty states. These differences in tax bases, rates and the overall tax structure 
result in vastly different tax revenue mixes. For example, nine states do not impose a 
broad-based personal income tax while four states collect more than fifty percent of their 
tax revenue from this source; five states do not impose a general sales tax while six 
collect more than fifty percent of tax revenue from general sales tax. Over time, the 
relative importance of various taxes has changed. For example, during the last several 
decades states have significantly increased their reliance on personal income taxes, while 
their reliance on corporate income taxes has decreased. 1 
The interstate and intertemporal patterns of state tax revenue mix reveal several 
questions: Why do states rely on some taxes more than others? How do states decide on 
the mix and magnitude of tax revenues? What factors influence tax structure decisions? 
1 Table I in Appendix 1 gives information on states' tax revenue mixes for the three most used 
tax sources - general sales tax, personal income tax and corporate income tax. These statistics 
are for the years 1979, 1989 and 1999. 
The purpose of the current research is to find the answers to those questions by 
examining tax revenue compositions across the fifty states within the 1979-1999 time 
frame. 
The term tax revenue composition describes the tax revenue portfolio, which is 
viewed as the division of tax revenue among different tax sources (tax shares). This 
analysis of state tax revenue composition is particularly important given that budget 
deficits and fiscal imbalances force state governments to stretch resources and cut public 
services, including K-12 education. To better illustrate states' tax revenue problems, here 
is a sample of today's (Spring, 2002) tax headlines: 
► Alaska House Approves Personal Income Tax; 
► Arizona Faces Continuing Budget Problems in 2002; 
► Arkansas Budget Troubles to Continue in 2002; 
► Criticism Mounts Against Florida Sales Tax Reform Proposal; 
► Illinois Receives More Bad Budget News; 
► Massachusetts House Approves $1 Billion Tax Hike Package; 
► Michigan Senate Finance Panel OKs Amendments to Sales Tax Act; 
► North Carolina's Budget Shortfall Expected to Hit$ 1 Billion; 
► Pennsylvania Lawmaker: Replace Property Tax With Local Income Tax; 
► Wisconsin Governor Takes Aim at Deficit. 2 
Some tax analysts suggest that a lack of diversity in tax revenue composition 
results in a revenue-unproductive tax system which in tum causes fiscal stress 
(Tannenwald, 2001). Likewise, this study's argument is that a solution to state revenue 
problems comes from analyzing state tax revenue composition and its responsiveness to 
changes in the private economy, tax competition from other states and political 
preferences. Therefore, this study considers these three broad influences and their effects 
2 World Wide Web <http://taxbase.tax.org> 
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on marginal decisions regarding the use of tax instruments and therefore the resulting 
revenues. 
1.2 Contributions of the Current Study 
The current study argues that policymakers influence the tax revenue composition 
(the mix and magnitude of tax collection) by making changes to the structural features of 
taxes, that is to their tax rates, tax bases and/or laws that define tax exemptions or 
deductions. The level of tax revenue collection and resulting tax shares are thus products 
of these changes and serve as proxies for the tax revenue portfolio that policymakers 
want to employ. Consequently, the current analysis of states' tax shares reflects the 
policymakers' preferences for reliance on particular tax sources and therefore the state 
tax revenue mix. 
In order to obtain insight into the reasons for state tax revenue composition, the 
current study analyzes three major tax sources and their respective tax shares: general 
sales tax, personal income tax and corporate income tax. 3 Combined, these three tax 
sources account for almost seventy-five percent of state tax revenue. These three tax 
sources also concern preferences of three groups of taxpayers: income earners, retailers 
and businesses. Given that policymakers are well aware of different tax preferences 
among taxpayers, they make changes to their tax revenue composition in such a way as to 
increase or decrease state reliance on a particular tax source and thus please one group of 
taxpayers while displeasing others. In addition, this study argues that different economic 
3 Definitions and detailed descriptions of general sales, personal income and corporate income tax 
shares are given in Chapter 2. The current study analyses states' reliance on these three taxes 
only and it does not consider a state's reliance on other tax sources. 
3 
conditions and competitive pressures across states influence state tax decisions. The 
policymakers consider the state's industrial mix and how revenues respond to the level 
and kind of economic activity located within their jurisdictions. For example, they also 
consider the tax competition that is made easier by cross-border shopping and the rise of 
electronic commerce. All of these considerations play a very important role in state tax 
revenue composition. Goal of the current research is to disintegrate these various 
influences and present state policymakers and researchers with the ways of making tax 
systems more productive. 
The current study conducts a theoretical and empirical analysis of the three tax 
shares. A system of tax share equations and their respective tax rates is estimated to 
consider how political factors, states' economic structure and tax competition affect 
marginal decisions on state use of the three tax sources. This study extends the existing 
literature in a number of ways: 
1. By analyzing tax revenue composition across fifty states during the twenty-one 
year period ( 1979-1999); 
2. By examining state tax revenue composition from (i) political economy and (ii) 
tax competition perspectives. In terms of the political economy approach, the 
current study defines and estimates political costs for the three tax revenue 
sources. In terms of interstate tax competition, the study allows for different 
kinds of tax competition among geographic neighbors. The difference in kinds of 
tax competition is based on differences in the nature of these taxes (e.g. 
consumption vs. income taxes); 
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3. By accounting for state production mix and determining the effects of seven 
different industries on state reliance on the three tax sources; 
4. By examining the effects that the interdependence among state tax rates has on 
the level of state tax rates as well as by identifying the border market 
characteristics that affect the level of state tax rates. 
This study takes a first step toward filling a lack of comprehensive analysis of the 
tax revenue composition of the fifty states. In addition to the above contributions, the 
current study has some limitations as well. The major limitation is the inability to model 
all components of the tax revenue portfolio. The framework developed by this study 
does not account for other components of state tax revenue composition (components 
other than general sales, personal income and corporate income taxes). Since the three 
tax shares do not sum to one, the analysis does not provide the whole picture of tax 
revenue portfolio and its determinants. However, the current framework can be extended 
to deal with other tax sources. 
The current study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 defines and discusses 
different tax sources. Chapter 3 summarizes the existing literature on government 
behavior, business location and interstate tax competition. Chapter 4 presents the 
conceptual framework used by the current study. The empirical model and data 
descriptions are given in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses estimating techniques used by 
the current study and presents the empirical findings as well as the results of several 
robustness tests. Chapter 7 gives concluding remarks and suggests contributions, 
limitations and further extensions for this study. 
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Chapter 2 
Individual Tax Sources 
2.1 Introduction 
Due to the fact that own tax sources are very important for the states and that state 
governments account for a large level of tax revenue collection in the United States, this 
study analyzes the changes in tax shares across the fifty states during the 1979-1999 
period. The tax shares presented in this work are calculated from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census data. 4 
During the last several decades, the relative importance of various tax sources in 
state tax revenue portfolios has changed. Casual observation of changes in tax shares 
during the 1979-1999 period and across the states suggests that states made shifts from 
one tax to another. For example, during the examined period, the state of Connecticut 
decreased its reliance on the general sales tax from 43 to 33 percent, while its reliance on 
the personal income tax increased from 4.8 to 37.5 percent. Similarly, during the same 
period of time, in Indiana and Missouri the general sales tax share went from 41 to 34 
percent and from 39 to 32 percent, respectively, while the personal income tax share 
increased from 22 to 38 percent (IN) and from 27 to 42.4 percent (MO). The changes in 
tax revenue portfolios are important for tax policy analysis, so the definitions and 
descriptions of several major tax sources as well as the patterns of these changes are 
discussed in this chapter. 
4 The Census reports state tax revenue in terms of gross collections minus tax refunds during the 
same period. 
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2.2 Personal Income Tax Share 
The personal income tax is established on the "ability to pay" concept. Today, the 
personal income tax is one of the most important sources of tax revenue for the states. It 
is defined as a tax on individuals' net income which often includes special types of 
income such as interest, dividends, income from intangibles and so on. Over the last 
several decades, the states have significantly increased their reliance on the personal 
income tax. In 1979, the state personal income tax share averaged twenty-six percent, 
ranging from fifty-eight percent in Oregon and forty-four percent in Delaware, to eight 
states (Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington 
and Wyoming) that did not impose a broad-based personal income tax. Due to different 
changes in the private economy over time, as well as the responsiveness of personal 
income taxes to economic changes, many states have made changes to their tax revenue 
portfolio. In 1999, the state personal income tax share averaged thirty-five percent; this 
time ranging from sixty-nine percent in Oregon and fifty-five percent in Massachusetts, 
to nine states (now including Alaska) that do not impose broad-based personal income 
taxes. Changes in states' reliance on this source of tax revenue for period 1979-1989 and 
1989-1999 are shown in Map 1 in Appendix 2. Generally, the darker the shading, the 
larger the increase. 
2.3 General Sales Tax Share 
The Census defines the general sales tax as a tax applicable (with only specified 
exceptions) to all types of goods and services, whether at a single rate or at classified 
rates. During the 1970s and 1980s, the general sales tax was the largest single source of 
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tax revenue at the state level. It averaged thirty-two and thirty-three percent of total state 
tax revenue in 1979 and 1989, respectively. Florida, Nevada, Tennessee and Washington 
collected more than fifty percent of their tax revenue from general sales taxes during this 
period. However, the general sales tax was not a source of revenue for five states 
(Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire and Oregon). Things changed slightly 
during the nineties when the personal income tax became the largest source and the 
general sales tax became the second largest source of tax revenue. In 1999, the general 
sales tax share averaged thirty-three percent. States like Connecticut, Indiana and 
Missouri, to name only a few, have significantly decreased their reliance on general sales 
taxes and have increased the reliance on personal income taxes. According to tax 
analysts, some of the reasons for this switch are the regressivity of general sales taxes as 
well as their responsiveness to fluctuations in business cycles. Map 2 shows the changes 
in general sales tax shares during the 1979-1989 and 1989-1999 periods and across the 
states. Again, darker shading represents a larger change. 
2.4 Corporate Income Tax Share 
The corporate income tax is imposed on the net income of corporations and 
sometimes on the net income of unincorporated businesses. The corporate income tax is 
an important source of state tax revenue, although it is somewhat decreasing in its 
significance. In 1979, the corporate income tax share averaged ten percent while in 1999 
this share averaged six percent. Rightfully or not, policymakers often fear that corporate 
income taxes can alter state economic development. Therefore, they frequently use 
corporate income tax breaks as a mean of attracting new businesses, competing with 
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other states and boosting economic development. Four states, Nevada, Texas, 
Washington and Wyoming, do not rely on corporate income taxes at all, while Alaska 
and New Hampshire collect twenty-four percent of their tax revenue from this source. 
Similarly, Delaware, Indiana and Michigan collect about eleven percent of their tax 
revenue from corporate income taxes. The changes in states' dependency on this source 
of tax revenue are shown in Map 3. Here, darker shading represents a smaller reduction 
or, for a few states, an increase. 
2.5 Other Tax Sources 
Besides the taxes already discussed, several other taxes contribute to state tax 
revenue. For instance, selective sales taxes are imposed on sales of particular 
commodities or services of particular businesses, separately and apart from the 
application of general sales taxes. Some examples include alcoholic beverages, tobacco 
products and gasoline. Selective sales taxes are a very important source of revenue for 
state governments. However, during the last several decades, they have been decreasing 
in significance, as some other sources have become more dominant. For instance, the 
selective sales tax share averaged nineteen percent in 1979 and fifteen percent in 1999. 
Variation in the use of this source is quite marked and ranges from a high of fifty percent 
in New Hampshire to less then eight percent in California. Changes in the importance of 
the selective sales tax share during 1979-1989 and 1989-1999 are shown in Map 4. 
In addition to selective sales taxes are other taxes such as business license fees 
(taxes exacted as a condition to the exercise of a business or non-business privilege, at a 
flat rate or measured by such bases as capital stock, capital surplus, number of business 
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units, or capacity); severance taxes (taxes imposed distinctively on removal of natural 
products from land or water and measured by value or quantity of products removed or 
sold such as oil, gas, other minerals, timber, fish, etc.); and death and gift taxes (taxes 
imposed on transfer of property at death, in contemplation of death, or as a gift). State 
reliance on these additional taxes varies significantly across the states. For instance, 
during the nineties, states like Alaska and Delaware collected more than sixty percent of 
their tax revenue from these additional tax sources. However, during the same period, 
eight states (Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York 
and Utah) collected less then ten percent of their tax revenue from these sources. 
Changes in taxes other than personal income, general sales, corporate income and 
selective sales taxes during 1979-1999 are shown in Map 5. 
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Chapter 3 
Background and Prior Literature 
3.1 Introduction to Prior Literature 
The existing literature on tax revenue composition and development of revenue 
systems is very limited. Hinrichs (1966) and Musgrave (1969) initiated the theory of tax 
revenue structure and economic development with different approaches. For instance, 
the focus of Hinrichs' work was the relationship between the stages of economic and 
fiscal development. On the other hand, Musgrave put stronger emphasis on 
administratively simple ways of collecting tax revenue as well as on changing tax handles 
to which the revenue system is attached. Similarly, Tait, Gratx and Eichengreen (1979) 
as well as Tanzi ( 1987) gave empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
evaluation of tax revenue and economic development in developing countries. Hettich 
and Winer ( 1987) and Gade and Adkins ( 1990) analyzed revenue structures of Canada 
and the United States, respectively. The attempt of the present study is to make a 
contribution to tax revenue analysis by explaining three major determinants of state tax 
revenue portfolio - political, economic and tax competition forces. In order to do so, this 
chapter summarizes relevant findings of three different sets of literature: literature on 
government behavior, tax competition and business location literature. 
3.2 Literature on Government Behavior 
To date, research devoted to government behavior has attempted to explain the 
evolution of tax revenue systems by using different theoretical frameworks. The question 
posed by this study is: Which theoretical foundation on the structure of tax revenue 
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systems best describes the altruistic yet self-interested, rational government? In order to 
answer this question, several different models of government behavior have been 
analyzed. Some constrain tax structure by the institutions of representative government 
while others consider government as "Leviathan" with unlimited power to tax. However, 
the current study relies on the findings of the probabilistic voting literature as well as the 
portfolio choice models. 
The probabilistic voting models are founded on the spatial models of electoral 
competition. The probabilistic voting models start from the assumption of a 
representative democracy with probabilistic voting in which voters choose between the 
candidates on the bases of the policies that they propose to implement. The policymakers 
perceive that there is a probability that voter i will support his platform. Therefore, each 
policymaker seeks to maximize his expected number of votes subject to the structure of 
the private economy (Coughlin & Nitzan, 1981; Hettich & Winer, 1988; Coughlin, 1992). 
Expected vote maximization is based on the view that political outcomes can be 
described as equilibrium in the sense that officials balance voters' heterogeneous interests 
(Chernick & Reschovsky, 2000). Given that the responses of the electorate cannot be 
perfectly predicted by the candidates, the probabilistic description of the voters' choice 
behavior seems reasonable and realistic (Calvert, 1986). In the current study, the tax 
revenue portfolios are presumed to be a result of probabilistic voting. Thus, the 
policymakers that determine tax revenue compositions are assumed to maximize voters 
support subject to the structural feature of a state's economy and tax competition with 
other states. 
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Besides the probabilistic voting literature, the findings of the portfolio choice 
models lead some of the current study' s arguments. White ( 1983) pioneered the portfolio 
choice model of tax structure. The centerpiece of the portfolio approach is the derivation 
of a frontier that depicts the trade-off among characteristics of a state's tax system. 
Gentry and Ladd (1994) extended White's methodology and incorporated a broad set of 
characteristics and directly compared two states. They examined how a state's economy 
and the nature of its taxes affect the chosen tax revenue mix. Braun and Otsuka ( 1998) 
examined the contributions of a state's economic condition and the tax structure to the 
growth and variability of tax revenue flow. Their focus is on how the tax structure 
interacts with the state economy to constrain the choices obtainable to the government 
officials. Given the interest of the current study to analyze state tax revenue mix from 
political economy and tax competition aspects (and not stability, efficiency, growth 
and/or complexity of tax revenue portfolio), theoretical foundations of the portfolio 
choice models are not going to be a centerpiece of the current study. The current study 
argues that a more comprehensive analysis of tax revenue portfolio must include the 
political and tax competition elements that are embodied in the tax decisions. Therefore, 
the following analysis of state tax revenue composition is only partially relying on 
portfolio choice literature. 
Optimal taxation theory offers complement to portfolio approach. Optimal 
analysis uses a general equilibrium approach to focus on the trade-off between equity 
goals and the dead weight loss of taxation. The integration of equity and efficiency goals 
requires policy makers to determine a tax structure that minimizes deadweight losses for 
particular distributional goals. The optimal taxation literature supports selective 
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consumption taxation rather than income taxation usmg an mverse elasticity rule 
(Ramsey, 1927; Diamond & Mirrlees, 1971; Stiglitz & Boskin, 1977; Sh oven & Whalley, 
1977, 1992). The level of abstraction limits practical implementation of optimal taxation 
theory. Although the optimal taxation provides excellent guides to the design of tax 
revenue portfolio, it assumes that policymakers have no political agenda of their own. 
Given the interest of the current study in testing the effects of the political forces on state 
tax revenue composition, the reliance on the optimal taxation literature is going to be 
very limited and primary focused on policymakers objective to minimize the total excess 
burden of proposed tax revenue portfolio. 
Two additional, widely utilized approaches to government behavior are the 
median voter and Leviathan theorems. The models of collective choice utilize the 
median voter theorem of Duncan Black (1958) and apply it to the choice of tax rates and 
thus tax shares. In median voter models, each voter can propose amendments to the 
existing status with the intent to achieve his/her preferred outcome. In this traditional 
approach, government maximizes the preferences of the median voter through institution 
of majority rule under the assumption that these preferences are single-peaked and 
unidimensional. Given the interest of the current study in analyzing the determinants of 
the tax revenue portfolios, that are, by their nature, multidimensional, the median voter 
assumptions would introduce a degree of inconsistency into the tax revenue decisions. 
A different set of literature suggests evolution of tax systems, and therefore the 
resulting tax revenue portfolio, to be a product of bureaucrats' revenue-maximization 
behavior. According to this approach, the multidimensional tax structure is used by 
"Leviathan" in order to maximize total revenue and to discriminate among taxpayers 
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(Brennan & Buchanan, 1980). Further, the electoral process is not sufficient to confine 
the "Leviathan" and therefore, the government should be constrained by constitutional 
limits. Similar to a utilitarian approach, this method relies on strong assumptions. In 
reality, government officials face a trade-off in setting tax systems to fund a desired level 
of public goods and they are concerned about voters' opinions. Policymakers are well 
aware that in order for them to remain in office, they have to worry about the voters' 
support. 
The above mentioned literature contributes greatly to the public finance field. 
However, there are three open questions to deal with. These questions are: 
1) the consideration of all major factors that drive the tax decision ( e.g. structural 
changes of private economy and the resulting industrial mix); 
2) the specification of the preferences of the rational policymakers ( e.g. the 
policymaker's objective to maximize voters' utility as well as voters' support); 
3) the role of the fiscal interaction between governments of the same level -
horizontal competition. 
The current analysis intends to utilize portfolio and probabilistic voting theories 
and combine them with the business location and tax competition theories. In particular, 
the current study follows Hettich and Winer's (1988) approach to government behavior. 
Hettich and Winer' s approach views government as neither as altruistic nor as Leviathan 
as the two polar approaches to government behavior suggest. Hettich and Winer extend 
traditional models of welfare maximization by considering altruism in a rational choice 
framework. In addition, they focus on political equilibrium and their implications for 
resulting tax shares and therefore tax revenue portfolio. In Hettich and Winer's approach 
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the government maximizes its utility function by maximizing voters' support function 
and tax revenue. This approach allows for simultaneous consideration of politicians' 
preferences, characteristics of state private economy and tax competition with neighbors. 
3.3 Literature on Business Location 
As an economic factor, businesses are necessarily self-interested in the sense that 
they seek to maximize profits. Therefore, a location decision of a given firm depends on 
its profitability at a particular location as well as on its profitability at alternative sites. 
Each location provides a unique combination of market and cost characteristics, taxes, 
public goods and services, amenities, which in tum result in different levels of business 
profitability. On the other hand, diverse businesses and their characteristics contribute 
differently to the state's private economy and therefore to tax revenues available to state 
governments. Thus, different businesses contribute differently to a state's tax domain 
and therefore tax revenue mix. On this basis, the characteristics of state economy are 
additional reasons for the differences among states' tax revenue portfolios. 
The literature relevant to this essay has examined whether interdependence 
between the level of economic activity and taxation exists. The classical, regional 
science approach to business location stresses the importance of sources of inputs and 
markets for outputs at exogenously determined locations, as well as the transportation 
costs of these inputs or outputs. Such an approach does not consider taxes as a major 
factor in firm location (Clarton, 1983; Carrol & Wasylenko, 1994; Hines, 1996). 
However, the public finance literature has developed its own approach. Its theoretical 
and empirical attention has focused on fiscal differences between the states and interstate 
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tax competition as determinants of business location decisions. Bartik (1994) and 
Wasylenko ( 1997) summarized the literature on whether taxes are a significant 
determinant of regional and local economic development. The authors reported various 
conclusions on the relationship between economic growth and taxation. Bartik suggested 
that the interregional elasticity of economic activity with respect to taxes is between -0.1 
and -0.6, and on average, it is -0.3. Wasylenko's findings suggest that the interregional 
elasticity is -0.2. Wasylenko's review of the literature suggests that taxes have a small 
effect on interregional location behavior. The majority of findings suggest a very small 
influence of any government policy on the location decisions. However, despite the 
differences in some empirical findings, in general, there is an agreement between the 
public finance and business location literature. Both agree that taxation has small effects 
on business location and so is unlikely to substantially stimulate or initiate development. 
This is because, for most businesses, total taxes are a much smaller proportion of 
expenditures than are capital or wage costs. Therefore, state taxes should carry some 
weight mostly at the final stage of location decision-making given the small interregional 
elasticities of economic activities with respect to taxation. Thus, some authors consider 
state taxes exogenous to regional economic development (Fisher & Peters, 1997). This 
conclusion is very important for the current study given that it eliminates the possibility 
of endogenous effects of industrial mix on state tax revenue portfolio. 
3.4 Literature on Tax Competition 
Many economists have recognized the importance of the structure of the tax 
revenue system and used its different elements in order to explain the ways tax structure 
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and tax revenue portfolio operate. Previous studies indicate factors that influence the tax 
mix to include: tax exporting (Gade & Adkins, 1990; Morgan, Mutti & Rickman, 1996), 
tax competition (Kanbur & Keen, 1993; Fuest, 2000), elasticity of the tax system (Oates, 
1975;) and complexity of the tax structure (Wagner, 1976; Warskett, Winer & Hettich, 
1998). As stated earlier, one of the primary focuses of this study will be on tax 
competition. Given the ease of movement and open borders in a decentralized country 
like the U.S., the occurrence of tax competition might cause changes in tax revenue 
portfolio and planning difficulties for government officials. There are two concepts of 
fiscal competition that occur between the governments: vertical competition5 and 
horizontal competition. Given the interest of the current study to analyze different tax 
shares and their patterns across the states, the focus is on horizontal competition. 
Horizontal competition refers to competition between governments of the same level, 
e.g., it results in various sorts of externalities such as transfer of tax burdens and 
overlapping powers. 
In the existing public finance literature, tax competition attracts much attention 
through the ability of states to impose taxes on nonresidents and thus to collect additional 
tax revenue. Researchers give different arguments for and against tax competition. 
Some suggest that a variety of fiscal policy instruments can boost economic 
development, diversify communities and lead to greater government efficiency and 
innovations (Gordon, 1983; Fisher, 1991; Gordon & Wilson, 2001; Perroni & Scharf, 
5 Vertical competition is a division of functions and powers among levels of governments and it 
refers to their fiscal competition for tax revenue (Breton & Scott, 1978; Breton 1996). Vertical 
competition distorts the spending priorities of recipient jurisdictions (Gramlich, 1977) and 
underlines promotion of fiscal illusion (Romer & Rosenthal, 1980). 
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2001 ). Others argue that it can increase the mobility of factors of production, lower the 
size of government and the level of public goods and services provided (Keen & 
Marchand, 1997; Sinn, 1997; Hoyt & Jensen, 2001). 
In addition, researchers have taken theoretical and empirical approaches to the 
analysis of tax competition. Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and Kanbur and Keen (1993) 
developed a theoretical approach to fiscal competition and used general and partial 
equilibrium models to examine the tax revenue that arises from competition between 
jurisdictions. Parallel to this theoretical literature, empirical research examines the 
effects of tax competition on tax revenues, tax rates and public expenditures. Hewett and 
Stephenson (1983) looked at the effect of rate changes in Iowa's income, sales, corporate 
income and motor fuel taxes on its tax revenue. Similarly, Case, Hines and Rosen (1989) 
and Besley and Case ( 1995) originated the yardstick competition approach to tax 
competition theory. They tested the hypothesis that voters compare a tax-expenditure 
package in their state with that of their neighbors. The yardstick competition results in 
pressure for policymakers to provide services at the lowest cost. The findings of both 
theoretical and empirical works on tax competition suggest that interdependence exists 
between a state's tax revenue, its own tax rates and the tax rates of competing states. 
3.5 Overview 
As stated before, the attempt of this study is to further the understanding of the 
political economy of tax systems by exploring whether tax competition and economic 
development impact government choices of the tax revenue portfolio and whether these 
choices remain consistent with the assumption of politicians' vote-maximization. The 
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main problem in analyzing government is providing a model of government behavior 
capable of accounting for the observation that state government acts in the interest of its 
citizens but is also a rational and self-interested body. The review of existing theories 
presented in this chapter showed extensive work devoted to modeling government 
behavior and developing models of tax structure as well as the explanation of tax revenue 
design. The underlying theme of the existing models was that the industrial mix and tax 
competition within a political economy framework could explain tax revenue mix. This 
approach was found to be sensible given the focus of this research and its intent to bring 
three theories together. Understanding and recognizing the factors that shape state tax 
revenue mixes might be of significant importance to both policy-makers and economists. 
This literature review provides the basis for the conceptual framework that follows. The 
next chapter presents a theoretical framework that describes an altruistic, yet self-




4.1 Introduction to Hettich and Winer's Model 
The goal of this chapter is to augment Hettich and Winer' s 1988 (H& W) 
approach to government behavior by allowing for the interaction among state 
governments and the interdependence of taxes within the state. Further, the equilibrium 
tax shares are derived from this new, augmented H&W model and they are presented in 
this chapter as well. These tax shares serve as a theoretical framework to the empirical 
model of tax revenue portfolio that is presented in Chapter 5. 
In the H&W model, the decision-makers are elected officials whose ultimate goal 
is assumed to be reelection. As such, government officials have to decide how to use the 
state's limited resources to efficiently raise a sufficient amount of revenue while, at the 
same time, maximizing voters' support and providing public goods and services. Thus, 
according to the H&W framework, the k-th voter's support for government official is 
given by the following support function: 
k = 1,2, ... , N 
(1) 
The arguments of the support function ( 1) are the benefits, bk, and costs, ck, of the public 
sector. Benefits have a positive impact on the support function, while the costs of 
providing these benefits have a negative effect on voters' willingness to support a 
government official. The level of public goods and services, G, positively influences the 
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benefits that voters receive, dbk I ac > 0. On the other hand, the loss in full income, 
h, determines the cost of taxation 6, ck, and has a positive influence on policymaker's costs 
of collecting tax revenue, ck k I di k > 0. 
4.2 Augmented Hettich & Winer's Model 
Considering multiple state governments and allowing for interstate tax 
competition extends the H&W framework. This research assumes that there are two 
government officials who reside in two neighboring states i, where i= 1,2. Following the 
H& W approach, each government official's tax revenue portfolio is modeled as if the 
policymaker maximizes voters' support. Given the importance of own-revenue sources, 
the focus of analysis is on three tax sources - the general sales tax (GST), personal 
income tax (PIT) and corporate income tax (CIT). The tax rates (j = GST, PIT, CIT) in 
state 1 are given by a tax vector t1= (t 1GsT, t1rIT, t1cJT). Each state is assumed to be 
composed of three representative voters - one for each tax source in question. Three 
representative voters are assumed to reflect different preferences of different taxpayers: 
retailers, income earners and businesses. These representative voters differ in terms of 
their tax payment duties and the benefits they receive from the public sector. The 
representative voters are assumed to adjust their voting patterns as well as their economic 
activities with respect to the changes in the state's own tax rates. Each representative 
voter is also assumed to have a reservation price, t\ for consumption of a particular 
6 The loss in full income is given by the following relation: Ik = (TRk + dk) where TRk is the 
amount of tax revenue collected from source k and is defined by the following relation: TRk= (h 
* Bk)• The term Bk represents the level of taxable economic activity; tk is the tax rate and dk 
represents the welfare loss due to taxation. 
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economic activity, B 1i. The respective reservation price is less than or equal to the tax 
rate associated with each activity, t1i. In addition, the assumption is made that a change in 
t\ has a direct effect on the level of economic activity consumed by its respective voter, 
B\. Due to a decrease in taxpayers' purchasing power and changes in taxpayers' 
behavior, it is expected that the level of economic activity, B\, decreases as a state raises 
its respective tax rate, t\. That is, oB} jot} < 0 (Hewlett & Stephenson, 1983) is 
assumed. If government official 1 increases tax rate j, this will force the representative 
taxpayer j to "voice" her reaction with respect to the loss in income via voting 
(Hirschman, 1970). The inconvenience induced by high t\ at home might result in the 
loss of votes in the next election from this representative taxpayer. Government officials 
know that an increase in t1i can influence political costs associated with taxation and that 
voters may opt to change their votes in next election and consequently express their 
preferences for taxation. Therefore, an increase in t\ might have negative political 
consequences for the government official and, politically, it is highly undesirable. 
Additional assumptions are made to the H&W framework. In particular, the 
interdependence of taxes within the states is assumed to exist. For instance, tax rate h 
(t\) where h is some other activity different than j and within state 1, will affect the level 
of economic activity j, B;. Here, it is assumed that representative taxpayers alter their 
behavior in such a way that B\ decreases due to an increase int\, oB~ /ot~ < 0, and at 
the same time changes the level of B \ oB; I ot 1 > 0 . 
< 
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Besides the reelection pressures, elected officials are assumed to face additional 
competitive pressures - the "yardstick" competition with the neighboring states. In 
classical yardstick competition, the jurisdictions compete for the residents and/or 
businesses. However, the approach used by this study is somewhat different from the 
traditional one. Here, it is assumed that migration and business location decisions are 
made on exogenous factors other than taxation. Given the small interregional elasticities 
with respect to taxes found by Bartik (1994) and Wasylenko (1997) as well as tractability 
reasons, this assumption is made so it can be possible to focus on factors that influence 
state tax shares. Thus, state officials are assumed to compete for tax revenue collected 
from non-residents. At the same time, government officials try to discourage home 
residents from tax shopping in the neighboring states, and therefore keep the tax revenue 
in the home state. Therefore, the home state tax portfolio is sensitive to tax competition 
with the neighboring states. 
Furthermore, the yardstick competition between the states is based on the tax 
rates available in each of the states.7 It is assumed that tax rates chosen by one 
government influence the choices made by another government (Hewett & Stephenson, 
1983; Case, Hines & Rosen, 1993). The choice of tax rates as tax competing tools is 
made for several reasons. The tax rates are very visible to voters and therefore any 
changes to these visible instruments can result in political opposition. In addition, the 
voters can very quickly adjust their economic behavior to take advantage of differences 
in the tax rates between the states. Furthermore, policymakers' chances for reelection are 
7 For a comprehensive discussion of fiscal instruments available to government, see Wellisch 
2000. 
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particularly sensitive to tax rate adjustments given the difficulty of adjustment as well as 
the political costs it induces. Nevertheless, given the effects that changes in tax rates 
have on a state's tax revenue collection, they are frequently proposed solutions to revenue 
problems. 
With regard to tax competition, two different kinds of tax competition between 
the neighboring states are assumed. The argument is that policymakers recognize the 
different institutional arrangements for consumption and income taxes and, thus, compete 
differently about these taxes. More precisely, tax competition based on the general sales 
tax is assumed to be competition for cross-border shoppers and for tax revenue collected 
from non-residents. On the other hand, given the previous assumption on immobility of 
residents and businesses as well as the institutional structure of tax system in the United 
States, tax competition based on the personal and corporate income taxes is assumed to 
have "leader-follower" characteristics. Thus, the two kinds of tax competition discussed 
in the following section are (i) Competition about lower price for the general sales tax; 
(ii) "Leader-follower" competition for the two income taxes. 
i) Competition Based on the General Sales Tax 
With respect to the general sales tax, it is assumed that the home state (state 1) 
competes with its neighbors in such a way as to attract cross border shopping by 
neighbors' residents and to discourage home residents from shopping in neighboring 
states. An example will illustrate tax competition. Assume the general sales tax rate in 
state 1 is lower (or equal) than the tax rate in the neighboring state 2. Home state 
residents will not engage in cross-border shopping in this case. On the other hand, the 
necessary condition for the residents of state 2 to engage in cross border shopping is for 
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the tax differential to be greater than travel costs and it is given by the relationship: (t2 -
t1)>v2. The residents of state 2 will take advantage of an available tax system in state 1 
as long as the savings in taxes exceed the costs associated with "cross border shopping".8 
Consequently, tax competition and rational behavior of voters from state 2 can result in a 
substitution effect that increases state 1 's taxable base as taxpayers of state 2 shift some 
of their economic activity to state 1, oB) / otJ > 0, to take advantage of the tax 
differential. 
Following, Mintz and Tulkens, the home state can respond to increases in the 
general sales tax rate in state 2 by either raising, lowering or keeping its tax rate the 
same9• The movement in home state tax rates will depend on whether the home state 
values expansion of private or public sector spending. For example, lowering tax rates in 
state 1 may be beneficial for this state if the benefit loss induced by the lower public 
goods and services is compensated by the gains obtained from the expansion in its tax 
base and the reduction of the excess burden on its taxpayers associated with its taxes 
(Mintz & Tulkens, 1986). 
ii) Competition Based on the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes 
Tax competition based on the personal income and corporate income taxes is viewed as a 
"leader-follower" competition. Given the institutional structure of the tax system that 
8 The same conditions and analysis hold for the residents of state 1 - for residents of state 1 to 
engage in tax shopping it has to be true that the tax differential is greater than the costs of 
transportation/reallocation: (t1 - t2)>v1• 
9 Mintz and Tulkens demonstrated that an increase in a neighbor's tax rate can produce a positive, 
negative or flat reaction function. Given these different scenarios, government officials in state 1 
can encourage (discourage) the residents in state 2 (as well as their own residents) to tax shop in 
state 1 depending on how t\ is changed in response tot he increase in t\ This will result in 
changes in the level of tax revenue collected. 
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requires residents to pay taxes at the place of work and allows them to receive tax credit 
at the place of residence, the income tax competition is viewed as a political competition 
rather than the competition for tax revenue 10• Furthermore, given the previous 
assumption of the immobility of the residents and businesses, there is no reason for states 
to compete for either residents or businesses and that is an additional motive for a 
"leader-follower" relationship. 
In order to maximize their political support, home state policymakers use 
neighbors with the highest income taxes as a benchmark to remind their residents and 
businesses of the price of public goods and services in the neighboring area. On the other 
hand, the residents and businesses of the home state have an option of "voting at the poll" 
with the personal income tax and "voting with dollars" with the corporate income tax, 
and thus expressing their preferences for the income taxes. However, policymakers 
realize that residents and businesses will not respond to tax differential by leaving the 
home state. "Voting at the poll" and "Voting with dollars" are assumed to be the ways of 
"disciplining" home state policymakers. 
An additional assumption regarding tax competition is that each state government 
official behaves in a "Nash manner." That is, he chooses the best response with respect 
to his beliefs of how neighboring state officials will play. By changing the tax rates, tax 
bases and deductions of different activities, and thereby shifting the burden of taxation to 
other activities, the policymakers are able to manipulate their tax revenue portfolio, in an 
10 The corporate income tax paid by the apportionment formula that serves as a proxy for the 
place of work of the corporations. 
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attempt to maximize voters' support. Therefore, the level of taxable economic activity in 
state 1 is given by: 
where 
dB 1. /at 1. < 0 where 
J J 
j = GST,PIT,CIT 
hi=} 
if(t/-t/) > v 2 
dB 1./at~ > 0 
J < 
dB 1./dt2 > 0 
J J 
only when j = GST 
(2) 
A similar analogy applies to the dead weight losses of j-taxes in state 1. 11 The 
vector x 1 represents the set of exogenous factors that determine demographic and 
economic characteristics of state 1. The costs of tax shopping for residents of state 1 are 
given by vector v1• After accounting for the above assumptions, the new support function 
of the representative voters that reside and vote for the government in state 1, S1, is given 
by the difference between the benefits and the costs produced by the public sector: 
S1 ={b1(G)- z.(c~(l}))} 
j=GST,PIT,C/T,OT 
(3) 
where OT are tax revenue sources other than general sales, personal mcome and 
corporate income taxes. 
11 The deadweight losses are given by the deadweight loss vector: d/= d/ (t/, t/, x1, v1). 
< < 
Following H&W it is assumed that iJd)/ >0 In addition, iJd}/ =0· and iJd}/ =0' 
/ar 1. • /ar~ ' /ar_2 
J > J > 
reflect the effect that the interdependence between the taxes within the state and interstate tax 
competition have on the excess burden. 
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The government official in state 1 has two sets of fiscal instruments at his 
disposal. He can choose the level of public expenditures, G1, and tax rates. Given the 
current study's interest in analyzing three tax sources - the general sales, personal income 
and corporate income taxes -- three respective tax rates are assigned to government 
officials as their tax revenue and tax competing tools, t1 = (t1GsT, t 1pJT, t1cJT). Thus, the 
policymaker will make the tax choices so as to maximize the voters' support function: 
max S1 = {b1(G1)-
c' ,rhsT ,riIT ,r~IT 
L (c~ (l~ )) } 
j=GST ,PIT ,CIT ,OT 
(4) 
Subject to a budget constraint: 
GI- ~ (t 1. • B1.) = 0 .L.J J J 
j=GST ,PIT ,CIT ,OT 
(5) 
and subject to the representative voters' responses to taxation reflected through the levels 
of taxable activities j, B 1= (B 1GsT, B1pJT, B1cJT). The (3+2) first-order conditions for 
government 1 's problem are given by: 
GI - ~ t 1. ·B1. =0 LJ J J 
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(8.3) 
The outcome of this optimization problem can be characterized as a non-
cooperative one where each state government behaves in the "Nash manner" choosing its 
own tax rate and thus level of public services to maximize voters' support while taking as 
a given the tax rate set by their neighbor. The resulting tax rates and the general sales, 
personal income and corporate income tax shares that maximize the government's 
support function in state 1 are given by: 
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(12) 
Where E j represents the elasticity of j taxable activity with respect to its tax rate. 
The main purpose of this model is to identify political, economic and tax 
competition factors that influence state tax revenue portfolio. Due to the current study's 
interest in explaining the movements in tax portfolio over time and across states, the 
equilibrium tax shares derived in equations (10) to (12) are further examined and their 
relevant determinants are defined in the following section. 
The first term of equations (10) to (12)' s numerators represents the total costs of 
taxation. The total costs of taxation include voters' losses in full income due to taxation 
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and hence the political costs of taxing one activity relative to another. The focus of the 
current study is on the political costs that arise from choosing one tax portfolio versus 
another. The tax portfolio model presented in this chapter (equation 10 to 12) allows for 
different political costs and different payoffs for government officials. In other words, 
some of the tax portfolio choices made by policymakers might have high political costs 
and low political benefits and vice versa. 
The terms in the second bracket of numerators of the portfolio model given by the 
equations ( I 0) to ( 12) reflect the structure of private economy in state 1, as well as the 
" 1 as,: 
interdependence of different tax sources, L,.}1i ~ - As stated earlier, government is 
Mj of j 
assumed to adjust state tax revenue portfolio in accordance to state economic 
development. As the economic characteristics of a state change, so do the tax handles to 
which the revenue system can be attached. Higher concentration of certain economic 
activities within the state allows for use of certain tax handles. Therefore, the presented 
model allows for state tax revenue mix to look differently depending on state production 
mix. 
Finally, the effects of interstate tax competition are expressed in the state's choice 
of tax revenue portfolio and its respective tax rates. The denominators and the final terms 
of equations ( 10) to (12), tj, reflect the effects that interstate tax competition has on state's 
choice of tax portfolio. Three tax rates are tax competing tools assigned to government 
officials. Each state government decides on its tax rates in a "Nash manner". The 
choices of level of tax rates have a direct effect on state tax revenue portfolio. 
32 
For purpose of policy analysis, this research is concerned with the effects that 
state tax rates, structure of state private economy as well as political environment have on 
state tax portfolio. The main argument is that as the factors that determine the supply of 
taxable activity change (the factors such as tax rates, characteristics of private economy 
and political factors), and as the cost of tax shopping changes, the political equilibrium 
and resulting tax revenue portfolio change as well. The model developed in this chapter 
allows several hypotheses to be tested. These testable hypotheses are the following: 
Hypothesis Number 1: 
As more tax revenue is collected from the potential tax base, 
political costs increase 
A standard argument regarding political costs is that political costs grow as more 
revenue is raised from the potential tax base (Hettich & Winer, 1984 ). The state i's 
reliance on tax source j, TSij, is influenced by the availability of that particular tax source, 
Bij, as well as the other tax sources, Bih in the state. Due to the political opposition of 
those taxpayers on whom particular tax,), will fall the policymakers will tend to rely less 
heavily on Bij· Therefore, state i's tax reliance on source j, TSij, will be lower. This 
approach is consistent with the view that manipulating the tax revenue portfolio 
minimizes political opposition to taxation by reducing the political costs. 
Hypothesis Number 2: 
As the state economic structure changes so does the state tax revenue 
portfolio 
The relative importance of a specific tax in total tax revenue depends on the level 
and kind of taxable economic activities available to government officials (McLure, 1981; 
Merriman & Skidmore, 1998). Shifts in the mix of state production across industries 
have an impact on state reliance on a particular tax. The structural changes of the private 
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sector give a wide range of taxable activities. Over time, these structural changes alter 
the magnitude of state reliance on a particular tax source and therefore state tax portfolio. 
The presence of different industries is expected to have a different effect on state tax 
revenue mix, dTS) /dB): 0. The changes in the industrial mix create new taxable 
activities and enable the policymakers to "go after" these new tax sources and, therefore 
increase/decrease their reliance on certain taxes. 
The following two hypotheses are regarding the interstate tax competition. As 
stated before, government officials are assumed to choose tax shares and tax rates in 
order to maximize their voters' support, while taking as given the tax shares and tax rates 
set by their neighbors. However, the forms of tax competition can differ across tax 
sources. 
Hypothesis Number 3: 
There is a negative relationship between the neighbors' general sales tax rate and 
the home state's general sales tax 
Given the ease of mobility between states, the presence of cross-border shopping 
as well as growth of electronic commerce, the tax competition with the neighboring states 
is based on general sales tax rate. The government officials choose general sales tax 
shares and tax rates with the recognition that home residents may shop in the neighboring 
states or make their purchases online. In addition, government officials attempt to set 
general sales taxes low enough so they can attract non-residents to cross-border shop. If 
a competing neighboring state raises its tax rates, the cost increase across the border will 
make the home state activities more attractive, which should lead to cross- border 
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shopping (Fox, 1986). In that case, state 1 will try to undercut the neighbor with the 
oTSbsr otbsr O 12 
lowest general sales tax in order to attract its residents, 1 2 < . 
otGST otGST 
Hypothesis Number 4: 
There is a positive relationship between the income taxes of neighboring states and 
home state income taxes. 
The yardstick competition that is based on personal income and corporate income 
taxes is established on a "leader-follower" relationship. The states follow the neighbor 
with the higher personal income tax as well as the neighbor with the higher corporate 
income tax. Mintz and Tulkens (1986) were able to show that change in a neighbor's tax 
rate can produce a variety of responses in the home country. The authors suggest that the 
overall effect of changes in tax rates in neighboring states will positively influence the 
level of taxable activity and therefore tax revenue in the home state. Similarly, Case 
(1993) found that a state is more likely to raise its tax rates when neighbors are doing the 
same. That is, as neighbors increase their reliance on a particular income tax source, one 
can expect the home state to do the same, 
Hypothesis Number 5: 
There is interdependence among home tax rates 
Changes in home tax rates other than tij within state i, can have effects on tij· For 
instance, if officials observe that more high-income people reside in state i, they might 
manipulate their tax revenue portfolio and propose an increase in personal income tax 
12 The only case when this is not going to hold is if neighboring state's general sales tax rate is so 
low that it is not worth reducing the home state general sales tax rate (Kanbur & Keen, 1993). 
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rates while lowering the general sales and/or corporate income tax rate. This proposal 
might be attractive to residents if a majority of them can benefit from lower general sales 
tax and/or lower corporate income tax. In other words, if the trade-off between the two 
taxes is beneficial for the majority of voters, the proposed changes in tax structure and 
therefore tax revenue portfolio might not be as politically costly to the government 
official, dt~ / dtJ1 : 0. 
4.3 Summary of the Conceptual Framework 
The current chapter provides the conceptual framework for the empirical analysis 
that follows. More precisely, in this chapter the Hettich and Winer's conceptual 
framework is presented. Furthermore, Hettich and Winer's model is augmented in order 
to account for the interdependence of taxes within the state as well as for interstate tax 
competition. The equilibrium tax shares that are derived from this augmented Hettich 
and Winer model identify political, economic and tax competition factors that influence 
state tax revenue portfolio. In the absence of exogenous binding forces, the resulting 
equilibrium tax shares, and therefore tax revenue portfolio, are assumed to be stable 
social convention and self-enforcing, and can be viewed as a rest point of some 
adjustment process. Several hypotheses are derived from the augmented Hettich and 
Winer's model and presented in the current chapter. These hypotheses are tested in the 
following Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Specification of State Government Behavior 
And Data Sources 
5.1 Introduction to Empirical Section 
The goal of this chapter is to specify an empirical model that is based on the 
underlying theoretical model presented in Chapter 4. The empirical model is viewed as 
an estimation of the theoretical one, advanced as a simultaneous approximation to the 
objectives outlined earlier. The focus is on estimating effects of political costs, the 
economic characteristics and the tax competition constraints that state officials face while 
raising tax revenue and deciding on the preferred tax revenue portfolio. Therefore, the 
current chapter identifies the empirical determinants of government behavior. 
Consequently, the chapter 
a) outlines the empirical model and presents the equations to be estimated within the 
theoretical framework; 
b) identifies dependent and independent variables and 
c) presents the data to be used for estimating the tax portfolio model. 
5.2 Estimating Equations 
In the theoretical analysis presented in Chapter 4, changes in state tax shares 
result directly from government officials' response to changes in political, economic and 
tax competition constraints. The benefits voters receive from consuming public goods 
and services and the costs of these services are determined simultaneously so as to 
maximize government officials' net political benefits. In the following empirical 
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framework, the argument is made that the assumed objective of government officials, the 
voters' support function Si= Si (bi, ci), is weakly separable between bi and ci. 13 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the government official is well aware of the political costs 
of collecting the revenue from a particular source and then providing the benefits. Hence, 
an increase in voters' public service benefits is preferred by policymakers at a decreasing 
rate. An additional argument for the empirical framework is that maximization of the 
voters' support function, Si, due to the voters' indirect influence on bi and c\ directly 
translates to the state's choice of tax revenue mix and officials' choice of tax competition 
tools, that is tax rates. Consequently, in the current empirical model, the state's tax 
revenue portfolio and the state's choice of tax rates are determined simultaneously. 
The following empirical model is a system for estimating structural equations for 
each of the tax shares available in state i and for each of tax rates associated with these 
tax shares. Given that a state's revenue is composed of taxes from many sources, the tax 
shares and tax rates to be examined include the general sales tax (GST), personal income 
tax (PIT) and corporate income tax (CIT). Specifically, the empirical model is given by: 
13 A disconnection between the tax revenue and expenditure has been widely discussed in the 
public finance literature. Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) state that: "Although good economic 
analysis calls for joint consideration of both aspects, the practice is to deal with them separately". 
Similarly, the current study recognizes the role of spending in tax revenue composition and 
therefore, it treats the spending as an important determinant of the tax revenue composition. 
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TaxShare1 = µ 1 + Politica!Costs/3 r + EconomicCharacteristicsf3t + 
TaxCompetitionf3;c + £ J 
+ 
where j = GST,PIT,CIT 
(13)-(15) 
TaxRate1 = µ J + HomeTRatesf3t + TaxShare/3;s + BorderMarket/3t + 
+ PoliticalParty/3 fP + Neighborf3;ir + lncomef3t· + E J 
where j = GST,PIT,CIT 
where h = GST,PIT 
(16)-(18) 
A 1050 x 1 vectorµ i contains the constant terms and term£ i represents the vector of 
error terms. 
5.3 Tax Share Equations (13) to (15) 
Equations (13) to (15) are used to examine the effects of political factors, state 
economic characteristics and tax competition on general sales, personal income and 
corporate income tax shares available to state governments. Dependent and independent 
variables for these equations are presented and defined in Table 2 and Table 3. The 
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relevant variables for the tax share equations (13) to (15) are grouped into four main 
categories. These four categories are Tax Share, Political Costs, Economic 
Characteristics and Tax Competition. 
5.3.1 The Tax Share Matrix 
The first set of variables is given by the Tax Share matrix. This matrix contains 
the information on the three tax shares across the fifty states and over the twenty-one year 
period. The tax shares are dependent variables. These variables are measured as a 
percentage of state total tax revenue. General sales, personal income and corporate 
income tax shares are defined following the U.S. Bureau of the Census definitions 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
5.3.2 The Political Costs Matrix 
The first group of tax share determinants is given by the Political Costs matrix. 
The policymakers receive instructions from the voters about the voters' tax preferences. 
These instructions are received through voters' financial contributions to policymaker's 
campaign, as well as via voters' votes during the election process. The political costs of 
making certain tax choices can be seen as the expected net loss in financial contributions 
or in votes that will result in the next election. Given the difficulty of measuring the 
political costs directly, the factors that influence political costs associated with taxation 
and prediction of the government's action are identified for this category. The argument 
is that the factors such as political opposition of those on whom a particular tax will fall 
are the forces that influence the political costs of the tax revenue mix (Hettich & Winer, 
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1984). Rational government officials keep an eye on various groups of taxpayers to see 
what decisions should be made to assure taxpayers' political support. Therefore, the 
variables included in the Political Costs category are calculated as the ratios of potential 
tax bases. These ratios are lagged by one period to better reflect the effect they have on a 
state's choice of tax revenue portfolio. The variables that serve as proxies for political 
cost that policymakers face are defined in Table 2. 
Each tax source (GST, PIT and CIT) is assigned two political cost variables. 
These political cost variables should reflect the size of one taxable activity relative to the 
alternative ones. The first political cost variable for the general sales tax share equation 
is the ratio of retail and service receipts to state personal income (Political Cost 
GST/PIT). The second political cost variable for the general sales tax share equation is 
the ratio of retail and service receipts to corporate income earned in state i (Political Cost 
GST/CIT). Similarly, the political cost variables for the personal income tax share 
equation are the ratio of state personal income to retail and service sales (Political Cost 
PIT/GST) and the ratio of state personal income to corporate income (Political Cost 
PIT/CIT). Finally, the political cost variables for the corporate income tax share equation 
are the ratio of corporate income to the value of retail and service sales (Political Cost 
CIT/GST) and the ratio of corporate income to state personal income (Political Cost 
CIT/PIT). Again, these ratios should reflect the relative size of alternative taxable 
activities on which a particular tax will fall and therefore the rise of political opposition 
of the voters, who will pay these taxes. 14 The signs on these variables should be negative 
14 The alternative ways of measuring the political costs, as well as their strengths and weaknesses 
are presented in Appendix 3. 
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and should express an increase in political opposition from those taxpayers on whom the 
particular tax will fall. In other words, the negative sign of the political cost variables 
should express high political costs associated with given tax portfolio. Therefore, in the 
case when political opposition to a tax increase rises, one can expect state reliance on that 
tax source to decrease. 
5.3.3 The Economic Characteristics Matrix 
One of the characteristics of state tax system that might concern the policymakers 
is the responsiveness of their tax portfolio to the level and kind of economic activity 
located within their jurisdictions. Musgrave (1979) argued that the ease of collecting tax 
revenue may be positively related to (a) the sectoral composition of the economy, (b) the 
percentage of workers employed in economic units that exceed a certain size limit and (c) 
the importance of large retail establishments. This suggests that the state's tax revenue 
might be more responsive to changes in the level of a particular economic activity if the 
state relies more heavily on one tax than it would if the state relied heavily on another 
tax, ceteris paribus. Similarly, McLure (1967, 1981) argued that one of the major 
determinants of the effect of state economic characteristics upon taxation is the 
dominance of the taxed industries in their respective markets as well as in the respective 
states. 15 The greater the degree of dominance, McLure argued, the greater the taxation of 
15 McLure examined the export rates for different states and various taxes (general retail sales, 
selective sales taxes, corporate income taxes, franchise and miscellaneous taxes) for 1962. The 
author's findings suggest a strong likelihood that a state will use the taxes that are most easily 
exported and thus adjust its tax revenue mix accordingly. An industry that leads within a state 
and has a national market, McLure argued, is a necessary condition for a state to take the 
advantage of its dominance. 
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that sector and the potential for tax exporting. 
The second group of tax share determinants, Economic Characteristics, is 
composed of variables that reflect the state's production mix as well as state market 
characteristics. For all three tax share equations the Economic Characteristics is the 
1050 x 11 matrix. The first seven variables of Economic Characteristics matrix 
characterize the industrial composition in the fifty states during the 1979-1999 period. 
The additional four variables define the state's market characteristics. Earlier, the 
argument was made that as the state's industrial make-up changes so does the state 
government's ability to raise tax revenue and provide public goods and services. 
The current study follows McLure' s methodology and identifies seven one-digit 
industries. The sample of these industrial classifications contains farming, mining, 
construction, manufacturing, trade, transportation and finance. These seven industries are 
classified as the ones that serve national markets. Furthermore, the percentages of the 
activity level of the firms in those industries are calculated. The number of employees in 
a particular sector serves as a proxy for that sector's activity level in the state. The ratio 
of the level of economic activity in a particular industry to the total non-government level 
of economic activity in a state is intended to measure the sensitivity of tax revenue 
portfolio to changes in sectoral composition of the economy (White, 1986). 
Other characteristics of state markets are also included in this analysis. These 
variables are state per capita income, population and the percentage of state's population 
that is prime working age. They are considered as the additional exogenous determinants 
of the private economy. The choice of these variables is widely supported by the 
economic literature. For example, Groves and Khan ( 1952), Legler and Shapiro ( 1968), 
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Murphy and Izraeli ( 1997) and Merrifield (2000) employed personal income per capita 
and population growth variables in their estimations of tax revenues. 16 Bhat ( 1997) 
employed additional economic growth indicators -- per capita public expenditures lagged 
one year -- to estimate tax revenue in India. The current study follows the existing 
literature closely and employs variables that reflect state personal income per capita 
(IncomePC), state population, (Population) and lagged public expenditure 
(ExpenditurePC) to capture different kinds of economic growth. 
Finally, in order to control for taste differences among taxpayers, an additional 
demographic variable that reflects the population characteristics within a state is 
employed. The percentage of the state population that is prime working age (PrimeAge) 
should help determine voters' preferences for different tax revenue portfolio. For 
instance, if the majority of a state's voters are older individuals, they might prefer a 
personal income tax to the alternatives as that would shift the tax burden to younger 
residents that are at the peak of their earning years. Metcalf ( 1993) found that residents 
that belong to the age group between eighteen and forty-four prefer fewer taxes collected 
from personal income and general sales. On the other hand, the elderly prefer selective 
sales tax, corporate income tax and personal income tax. By employing the variable that 
16 Groves and Khan (1952) investigated the income elasticity of various state and local taxes as 
well as the effects of changes in personal income on tax yields. Similarly, Legler and Shapiro 
(1968) examined the responsiveness of state tax revenue to economic growth in eight different 
states. To estimate tax revenue for different types of growth, Legler and Shapiro applied state per 
capita income and population growth variables. The data used in Legler and Shapiro's regression 
analysis was for the years 1945-64 from eight states: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Iowa, Maryland, Michigan and Ohio. Murphy and Izraeli (1997) found that as per capita income 
increases, the level of service demanded also increases. However, the residents' preference for 
particular taxes was not easily determined - it may increase or decrease. Similarly, Merrifield 
(2000) found that population growth has a significant positive influence on tax revenue. 
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reflects the pnme working age population, this study attempts to test Metcalf' s 
hypothesis that implies a relationship between the voters' age and state tax revenue 
portfolio. 
5.3.4. The Tax Competition Matrix 
In order to address the issue of interstate tax competition among geographic 
neighbors on a tax-by-tax basis, the third set of tax revenue determinants, the Tax 
Competition matrix, contains information on neighbors' tax shares, as well as on home 
state tax rates. A significant factor in determining state tax revenue mix is assumed to be 
interjurisdictional tax competition. The debate about modeling tax competition focuses 
on whether tax competition forces tax rates of neighboring states to move together 
(Hewett & Stephenson, 1983; Case, Hines & Rosen, 1993), or whether the tax 
competition is influenced by the presence of tax-havens (Chernick, 1997). Similarly, 
there is no agreement in the literature on who are a state's competitors - neighboring 
states or non-neighboring states that are similar in some respects. 17 Given that the 
neighbors share similarities that permit voters to compare among them when choosing to 
vote for a policymaker, the present study follows the Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) tax 
competition approach and assumes that state geographic neighbors are the most 
influential tax competitors. There are two reasons for this decision: (i) the neighboring 
states share some similarities that can be used by the voters to assess the appropriateness 
of changes in tax rates and thus tax revenue portfolios; (ii) voters often use information 
about neighboring states to "discipline" and judge their policymakers (Basley and Case, 
17 For detailed discussion on the choice of a state's competitors, see Appendix 3. 
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1995). However, it should be noted that even thought cross-border shopping is by far the 
most important element of tax competition and is frequently used by voters to avoid high 
taxes, it is not the only way of avoiding the taxes. Electronic commerce and catalog sales 
are another increasingly popular methods of residents' shopping that significantly affects 
state tax revenues (Bruce & Fox, 2000). The presence of these alternative methods 
intensifies tax competition among the states by giving the residents an option of relatively 
cost less cross-border shopping. Given different pricing strategies associated with the 
electronic commerce and the catalog sales shopping ( costs of shipping and handling) as 
well as the inability of state governments to affect federal government legislation, these 
other shopping options are not going to be examined in empirical section. Due to the 
current study's focus on the political economy aspect of tax competition and the role that 
neighbors and cross-border shopping have in determining the home state choice of the tax 
revenue portfolio, more detailed treatment of other shopping options ( other then cross-
border shopping) is left for future research. 
Furthermore, given the interest in examining the possibility that a representative 
voter from each group of taxpayers compares home state tax reliance with those in the 
neighboring states, the neighbors' tax shares are identified for general sales, personal 
income and corporate income tax share equations. In addition, due to the fact that this 
study deals with different kinds of taxes (consumption and income taxes), different kinds 
of tax competition between the neighbors are identified. The lowest general sales tax 
share in the neighboring area (Neigh. Min GST) is used as a determinant of home general 
sales tax share. Given the ease of cross-border shopping and the rise of electronic 
commerce, state policymakers set their consumption taxes relatively low comparing to 
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their neighbors in order to gain from the tax competition phenomenon. In addition to 
these economic components of tax competition, political factors also play an important 
role in determining a state's reliance on the general sales tax. Given that the residents 
compare their home state reliance on the general sales tax relative to the neighboring 
states, it is expected that the lowest reliance on the general sales tax in the neighboring 
area to be negatively correlated with the general sales tax share in the home state. 
A different kind of interstate tax competition exists in the case of income taxes. 
In this study, the political neighbors play an important role in determining state reliance 
on the two income taxes. Accordingly, the highest personal income tax share in the 
neighboring area (Neigh. Max PIT) and the highest corporate income tax share (Neigh. 
Max CIT) in the neighboring area, identified as those states with contiguous borders, 
during the 1979-1999 period, are examined to test the interstate income tax competition. 
Given the institutional characteristics of the two income taxes, the states are assumed to 
follow a political neighbor with the highest personal income tax and the highest corporate 
income tax. The idea is that policymakers refer to the neighboring state with the highest 
income taxes when reminding their own voters of the benefits provided by the public 
sector. For instance, if a neighbor with the highest personal income tax share increases 
its reliance on this tax source, the home state policymakers are expected to advocate the 
same change in their home state. Usually, the reason for this advocacy is better provision 
of public goods and services. Therefore, an increase in a neighbor's reliance on personal 
and/or corporate income taxes encourages home government officials to follow this 
neighbor by increasing their reliance on the same tax source. The higher the "highest" 
tax share for a particular income tax in the neighborhood, the more the home state 
47 
officials can rely on this source of revenue without a danger of losing voters' support and 
tax revenue erosion. Therefore, it is expected for the highest personal income tax and the 
highest corporate income tax shares in the neighboring states to have a positive effect on 
home state personal income and corporate income tax shares and therefore to alter state 
tax revenue composition. 
All three neighbors' tax shares (Neigh. Min GST, Neigh. Max PIT and Neigh. 
Max CIT shares) are lagged by one year to allow time for the government officials to 
respond to changes in their neighbors' tax policies. This way of analyzing tax 
competition between neighbors has been widely utilized by researchers. For instance, 
Hewett and Stephenson (1983) and Case (1993) used three- and two-year lags, 
respectively, in their studies. The idea is that, in practice, government officials are 
concerned with their tax policies relative to those of their neighboring states. 
Besides the neighbors' tax shares, the Tax Competition matrix for all three tax 
share equations contains an additional tax competition variable. Given the assumptions 
that state governments behave in "Nash manner" and that they use their available tax 
rates as tools for tax competition, the home state tax rates are included in three tax share 
equations (13) to (15). The yardstick competition between neighbors influences state 
officials to behave in "Nash manner", that is, to observe their neighbors' tax decisions 
and, based on that observation, make changes to their own tax system. In this study, the 
home state statutory general sales tax rate (GST Rate) and home state statutory corporate 
income tax rate (CIT Rate) are identified for this category. The choice of statutory tax 
rates is justified on the basis that changes in a state's statutory tax rates are very visible 
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forms of tax legislation to voters (Wagner, 1971; Nelson, 2000). In addition, the 
statutory rate structure determines the efficiency of state tax system. 
A different approach is used when determining the home state personal income 
tax rate. The personal income tax rate (PIT Rate) for the personal income tax share 
equation ( equation 17) is calculated as a ratio of personal income tax revenue collected to 
state adjusted gross income. Such a calculated personal income tax rate gives the state's 
effective personal income tax rate. The reason for the difference in treatment between the 
general sales and corporate income tax rates and the personal income tax rate is that, in 
contrast to statutory OST Rate and CIT Rate, modifications of state personal income tax 
laws tend to be less visible and not well understood by the public. Therefore, 
modifications of state laws that apply to the personal income tax tend to arouse less voter 
dissatisfaction. The policymakers tend to utilize this characteristic of the personal 
income tax and thus minimize the political costs of collecting personal income tax 
revenue. A detailed discussion regarding the determinants of state tax rates is given in 
the following section. 
5.4 Tax Rate Equations (16) to (18) 
Competitive tools available to government officials include different kinds of 
taxes, tax rates, the size of the taxable base and government expenditures. Based on the 
theoretical model presented in Chapter 4, the argument of this research is that 
government officials compete around tax rates, as changes in tax rates are rapidly 
reflected in the level of taxable economic activity. Furthermore, given the differences 
among the general sales, personal income and corporate income taxes, the empirical 
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specification of politically desirable tax rates is viewed to be slightly different for the 
three tax rates in question. Consequently, the determinants of tax rates are grouped into 
six different categories for the general sales and personal income tax rate equations 
(equations 16 and 17), and five categories for the corporate income tax rate equation 
(equation 18). 
5.4.1 The Home Tax Rates Matrix for Equations (16) to (18) 
The three tax rates examined by the current study - the general sales tax rate 
(GST Rate), the personal income tax rate (PIT Rate) and the corporate income tax rate 
(CIT Rate) -- are assumed to be interdependent. Therefore, each tax rate equation is 
explained by the Home Tax Rates matrix. The variables that compose the Home Tax 
Rates matrix are the two tax rates other than the tax rate in question. The 
interdependence between different tax rates is assumed to exist and to influence the 
movements in tax rate levels, which in tum influences state tax portfolios. 
5.4.2 The Tax Share Vector for Equations (16) to (18) 
Penniman (1971) argues that state tax rates depend on the degree of a state's 
previous reliance on a particular tax source. The current study follows the same 
argument and defines state's previous reliance on the three tax sources. It contains the 
lagged general sales tax share (GST Lag) for the general sales tax rate equation (equation 
16); lagged personal income tax share (PIT Lag) for the personal income tax rate 
equation (equation 17); and lagged corporate income tax share (CIT Lag) for the 
corporate income tax rate equation (equation 18). It is expected that the lagged tax shares 
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will have a positive effect on their respective tax rates, given that they serve as the 
determinant of a state's earlier dependency on a particular tax. 
5.4.3 The Border Market Matrix for Equations (16) to (18) 
The current study assumes that geographic neighbors influence state tax revenue 
portfolios. The argument is that states consider their border counties' population and 
income characteristics when determining home tax rates. An additional argument is that 
states consider their neighbors' border counties' population and income characteristics 
when deciding on home tax rates and thus the tax revenue mix. The Border Market 
matrix contains the population and income characteristics of a state's border market. 
The first variable of the Border Market matrix is the home state population that 
lives in bordering counties (Home Border Pop), as a percentage of total state population. 
Second, the neighbors' population that lives in bordering counties of the reference state, 
Neigh. Border Pop, is calculated as a percentage of the neighbors' total population. The 
variable that defines home state income earned in bordering counties, as a percentage of 
total income earned within the state, Home Border Income, is the third variable of the 
Border Market matrix. Similarly, the neighbors' income earned in bordering counties, 
Neigh. Border Income, is calculated as a percentage of total income earned within the 
' 
neighboring states. 
Both population and income variables should help to measure the magnitude of 
the broader market served by the home state. The characteristics of the border market 
give policymakers complete information on the number of residents that can relatively 
easily "tax shop". The government officials might use the information on border 
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population and border income to adjust home state tax rates and take advantage of border 
tax liability. Thus, the argument is that the states consider the number of taxpayers who 
can relatively easily cross-border shop and contribute to the state's tax revenue. The use 
of border population and border income as tax rate determinants is an alternative 
approach to Case, Hines and Rosen ( 1989), who suggest taking into account home and 
neighboring population that lives in bordering counties. The argument of the importance 
of border population and income for tax competition is consistent with the tax 
competition literature (Case, 1993). 
5.4.4 The Political Party Matrix for Equations (16) to (18) 
The importance that political parties have on public policy has been widely 
examined by researchers. Joseph R. Star (1939) writes: 
"The political party is an agent in the formation of public opinion. It is widely 
believed that political parties crystallize public opinion at election times by 
presenting statements of policy to the voters." 
Similarly, Sarah McCally Morehouse (1983) writes: 
"The political party has been declared a major independent contributor to policy 
making in the statewide model... In the statewide model, the kind of party 
organization was shown to be a major intervening variable between the needs of 
the statewide constituency and the satisfaction of those needs." 
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The current study attempts to account for state tax revenue composition on the 
basis of one party control of the state legislature and governorship. In reality, party 
membership has different meaning in different states in the United States. Despite the 
great diversity of party systems, ideologically, the conservatives are viewed as the ones 
who prefer lower taxes and taxes that are more regressive, such as general sales taxes. 
On the other hand, the liberals are viewed as the ones who prefer bigger government 
spending and more progressive taxes such as income taxes. The current study uses the 
Republican Party membership as a quantifiable criterion for identifying a conservative 
state legislature and governorship. In particular, the Political Party matrix has four 
variables that identify Political Party membership of state legislative and executive 
branches. These four variables identify the following: (a) if state House of 
Representatives is controlled by the Republican Party (HRep); (b) if the state Senate is 
controlled by the Republican Party (SRep); (c) if the Governor of state is a member of the 
Republican Party (GRep) and (d) if all three offices (House, Senate & Governor) are 
controlled by the Republican Party (SHG). 18 
The expected signs of these four variables (HRep, SRep, GRep, SHG) are 
expected to be positive for the general sales tax rate equation ( 16) and reflect officials' 
preference for higher regressive taxes. On the other hand, the expected signs of HRep, 
SRep, GRep and SHG are expected to be negative for the personal income tax rate 
18 The treatment of Nebraska's Legislature was slightly different from other states, given that 
Nebraska has the Unicameral Legislature (a single-house state legislature). In particular, if the 
Republican Party had a control over Nebraska's Legislature this was treated as if the Republican 
Party had control over both, House and Senate. 
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equation (17) and the corporate income tax rate equation (18). This would reflect 
officials' distaste for higher progressive taxes. 
5.4.5 The Neighbor Matrix for Equations (16) to (18) 
As stated before, tax competition between the neighboring states is based on tax 
rates. The changes in neighbors' tax rates have an effect on home state choice of tax rate, 
and therefore the composition of tax revenue. The Neighbor matrix contains the 
information on neighbors' tax rates lagged by one year, lagged neighbors' expenditure 
per capita ( equations 17 & 18) and travel cost ( equation 16). With respect to the 
neighbors' tax rates, the lowest general sales tax rate (Neigh. Min GST Rate), the highest 
personal income tax rate (Neigh. Max PIT Rate) and the highest corporate income tax rate 
(Neigh. Max CIT Rate) in the neighboring area are identified for the fifty states during the 
1979-1999 period. The lowest and the highest tax rates in the neighborhood are 
identified for each state. These tax rates are used to capture interstate tax competition. 
The arguments for neighbors' lowest general sales and the highest personal income and 
corporate income tax rates are similar to the previous arguments for the tax shares. The 
states attempt to keep home residents and attract neighboring residents to engage in 
consumption by keeping low general sales tax rates and undercutting the neighbor with 
the lowest general sales tax rate. Therefore, it is expected for the lowest general sales tax 
rate in the neighboring states to have a negative effect on the home state's general sales 
tax rate. On the other hand, the higher that the "highest" income tax rate is for a 
particular tax source, the more policymakers can push for a tax rate increase, and the state 
can rely on this income tax without the danger of loss in voters' support and tax revenue 
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erosion. Therefore, it is expected for the highest personal income and the highest 
corporate mcome tax rates in the neighboring states to have a positive effect on the 
personal and corporate income tax rates in the home state. 
Similarly, it is expected that a neighbor's per capita expenditures (Neigh 
Expenditure PC) can influence home income tax rates (equations 17 & 18). Given the 
fact that income taxes are the least popular ones, the home state taxpayers are assumed to 
compare their well-being to those of people in neighboring states and to follow 
Hirschman's voice model. According to the voice model the resident voters compare 
states' fiscal performance. The policymakers are assumed to remind home residents of 
public goods provided by the neighboring states and therefore propose an increase in 
income tax rates. Neighbors' spending per capita is calculated as the average government 
spending of a state's geographic neighbors lagged by one year. Neighbors' spending per 
capita is expected to have a positive effect on the level of home state income tax rates. 
It is assumed that the general sales tax rate ( equation 16) depends on cost of 
traveling that is associated with cross-border shopping. Cross-border shopping will only 
occur if tax differentials exceed travel costs, so the travel cost variable adds an 
explanatory variable for the general sales tax rate equation ( 16). This variable 
(TravelCost) accounts for the cost of traveling between bordering counties. The 
TravelCost variable is calculated as a product of the distance between the bordering 
counties' centroids and the IRS mileage rate. The geography division of the U.S. Census 
Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, computes the population centers of the state 
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counties. The computation is done based on county population. 19 The distance between 
these population centers is obtained among the bordering counties for the fifty United 
States. In addition, the mileage rate is obtained for the 1979-1999 period. The Travel 
Costs variable (Travel Costs= Distance* IRS mileage rate (expressed in dollar terms)) is 
expected to have a positive effect on the general sales tax rate and to reflect the higher 
cost of cross-border shopping (Kanbur & Keen, 1993).20 
5.4.6 The Income Matrix for Equation (16) and Equation (17) 
The Income vector is used in the general sales tax rate equation ( 16). This vector 
contains the information on state median income (Median Income). The Median Income 
variable captures the level of state median income, which is expected to have a positive 
effect on the state general sales tax rate. 
Similarly, the Income matrix is used for the personal income tax rate equation 
(17). The two variables in the Income matrix are median income (Median Income) and 
the percentage of state households that earn $100,000 or more (HHincome $100K). It is 
expected that the level of median income will have a positive effect on the state personal 
tax rate. On the other hand, the percentage of households that earn $100,000 or more 
19 Detailed discussion about the method used in determining the centers of county population can 
be obtained from the U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Internet site 
<http://mac.usgs.gov/mac/isb/pubs/booklets/elvadist/elvadist.html>. 
20 Despite the age of e-commerce and ease of "on-line" shopping, the majority of states' tax 
revenue loss is due to the cross-border shopping. The fact that e-commerce activities are not 
taxable (excluding the Physical Nexus aspect) and that all states experience sales tax revenue 
losses due to this exclusion of e-commerce and catalog sales from a sales tax base, further 
contributes to the current study's argument about the importance of the neighbors and their 
residents' cross-border shopping. 
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intends to measure the state's high-income people and the influence of their lobby on tax 
decisions. The HHincome $100K variable is expected to have a negative effect on the 
personal income tax rate. 
5.5 Data Sources 
This section presents the data to be used for estimating the tax composition 
model. The data employed by the current study were collected for a 21-year period, 
beginning with fiscal year 1979. Given the scope of this study, the data come from many 
different sources and represent a unique set of information on the fifty states during the 
1979-1999 period. 
By focusing only on tax revenue composition, this research purposely abstracts 
from the role of special provisions and individual tax structure, as data limitations make it 
impossible to employ the more comprehensive definition of tax structure. Therefore, for 
the purposes of investigating the interdependence of tax shares within one state and 
across the states and over time, observations on state governments are utilized. The data 
used by this study are presented in Table 4. Specifically, individual tax share data is 
taken from State Government Tax Collections 1979-1999, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. The percent distributions of state government tax 
revenue for the personal income, general sales and corporate income taxes are calculated 
from these data. Similarly, data for state government expenditure by state, for the period 
1979-1999, are collected from State Government Finances, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
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The data on state personal income tax rates, general sales tax rates and corporate 
income tax rates are collected from the Federation of Tax Administrators data bank, State 
Tax Handbooks and Facts and Figures on Government Finance published by the Tax 
Foundation. 
Data for political cost variables (ratios among state personal income, corporate 
income tax base and retail and service receipts) are collected from several sources. In 
particular, state personal income data are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. The levels of the state corporate income tax base are calculated as the ratio of 
tax revenue collected from the corporate income tax source divided by the top corporate 
income tax rate. The data on state retail and service receipts are obtained from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census.21 
For the empirical model, the demographic information is obtained from a variety 
of sources. The demographic information that reflects income and population 
characteristics is obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. The information on population 
characteristics consists of the percent of people who are prime working age. State 
population and population by age data are obtained from the Census of Population and 
Housing, Bureau of the Census, the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
In addition, information about each state's labor force and sectoral employment 
(farm, mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, transportation and finance) is obtained 
21 Given that data on service receipts are obtainable only for every five years, the observations 
between the five years have been interpolated. 
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from a variety of sources. In particular, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and U.S. 
Bureau of Census, Economic Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers data sets 
during the 1979-1999 period are utilized. 
The information on Political Party variables is obtained from www.PoliSci.Com: 
The Political Reference Almanac, Internet site <http://www.PoliSci.com/almanac/Local>. 
The information on IRS mileage rates is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census 
Master Tax Guide. The information on the distance between the bordering counties' 
centroids is obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, 
Geography Division. 
The information about the bordering counties in the United States is obtained 
from the National Association of Counties, Internet site <http://www.naco.org1>. The 
data for estimating the effects of the border market (neighbors' border population and 
their income as well as the home state's border population and income) are obtained from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Accounts Data, Local Area Personal Income, 




Estimating Technique and Empirical Findings 
This chapter explains the estimating technique employed by the current study and 
reveals the study's empirical findings. The findings are broken down separately for the 
tax share (Table 7) and the tax rate (Table 8) equations. The data set used by the current 
study is a panel consisting of fifty states over the twenty-one year period for total of 1050 
observations. Estimating technique employed here is the three stage least squares 
technique. 
6.1 Estimating Technique 
Equations (13) to (15) and (16) to (18) are estimated jointly using panel data for 
fifty states during the 1979-1999 period. This system of equations is tested using 
simultaneous equation technique.22 The model is one where tax shares and tax rates are 
jointly determined -- all six equations are needed to determine the equilibrium tax shares 
and tax rates. This interdependence implies that some regressors are stochastic and 
correlated with the disturbance term. OLS may be applied to estimating this system; 
however, the estimators under OLS may be biased in the presence of simultaneity. 
Therefore, this study employs a full-information estimation method -- three-stage least-
squares - and compares the results with a couple of the alternative ones. 
22 In order to execute the robustness checks, two more estimating techniques are employed by the 
current study. Detailed discussion of these techniques as well as the obtained results are 
presented later in this chapter and in Appendix 3, respectively. 
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Three-stage least-squares is the baseline technique used in the current study. 
Three-stage least-squares technique is usually used for joint estimation of the entire 
system of equations. Three-stage least-squares is an estimating procedure that estimates 
all six equations (13) to (18) together as a set. Three-stage least-squares complements 
two-stage least-squares, which is a "single-equation" estimation method. Two-stage 
least-squares is a special case of the instrumental variable technique, an estimation 
procedure applicable when the independent variables are not independent of the 
disturbance term. Two-stage least-squares method is a single-equation method in the 
sense that it estimates a system of simultaneous equations by estimating each equation 
separately. This method ignores restrictions in all equations in the system, except the one 
being estimated. In order to produce "legitimate" instrumental variable estimators, the 
two-stage least-squares method combines all exogenous variables to create a combined 
instrumental variable. Two-stage least-squares, being the instrumental variable technique 
in general, produces consistent estimators. However, these estimators may be inefficient 
compared to the estimators that make use of cross-equation correlations of the 
disturbances, such as three-stage least-squares (Greene, 1993). That is, estimators that 
are more efficient can be obtained if the additional information contained in the entire 
system of equations is considered. These more efficient estimators are obtained based on 
the generalized least squares principle that is used by the three-stage least-squares 
technique. 
Three-stage least-squares is composed, unsurprisingly, of three steps. The first 
step involves estimation of two-stage least-squares estimates of the identified equations. 
Each equation is transformed by the transpose of the matrix of observations on all the 
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exogenous variables in the system and the generalized least squares method is applied to 
this new relationship. This creates the two-stage least-squares estimates. In the second 
stage, the structural equations' errors and their contemporaneous variance-covariance 
matrix are estimated using the two-stage least-squares estimates computed in stage one. 
Finally, in the third stage all the transformed equations from stage one are rewritten as a 
"single, very large equation" (Kennedy, 1998) and the generalized least squares method 
is applied. This produces the three-stage least-squares estimators. Given that the 
nonspherical disturbance of this "very large equation" can still have nonzero correlations 
between the disturbances of different equations, the contemporaneous variance-
covariance matrix of the structural equation's disturbances must be estimated in the third 
stage. 
There are several advantages of applying the three-stage least-squares technique 
to a system of equations (13) to (18). In general, the three-stage least-squares estimator is 
consistent and asymptotically more efficient than the two-stage least-squares one. Given 
that the three-stage least-squares method utilizes the knowledge of all restrictions in the 
entire system when estimating the structural parameters, it results in a smaller asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix than the single-equation estimators. On the other hand, if the 
disturbances in the structural equations are indeed uncorrelated, that is to say that the 
contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix is diagonal, three-stage least-squares 
(3SLS) will reduce to two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
In addition to the three-stage least-squares method, the full-information method is 
also available for estimating a system of simultaneous equations. The current study is not 
relying on this particular method for couple of reasons. First, if there is a specification 
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error in one or more equations of the system, that error is transmitted to the rest of the 
system and consequently, the entire system becomes sensitive to specification errors. 
Second, the full-information maximum likelihood method is more appropriate for non-
linear system of equations and therefore, the computational costs of the full-information 
maximum likelihood method are enormous. Therefore, given the characteristics of the 
three-stage least square method and its strengths compared to the two-stage least-squares 
and the full-information maximum likelihood methods, the three-stage least squares 
technique is applied by the current study as the baseline approach to estimating a system 
of equations presented earlier. 
6.2 Identification Problem 
The identification problem is associated with a simultaneous equation system. 
This problem raises a question of the possibility of obtaining meaningful estimates of the 
structural parameters. If the estimates of the structural parameters do estimate these 
parameters and not something else, the parameters are considered to be identified. 
Therefore, each equation in a system of simultaneous equations (13) to (18) is checked to 
see if its structural parameters are indeed identified. Economic theory can be used to 
place restrictions on the set of simultaneous equations and therefore solve the 
identification problem. Another way to check whether or not a system of simultaneous 
equations has enough restrictions to circumvent the identification problem is to check for 
order and rank conditions. The order condition is a necessary condition for 
identification; however, it is not sufficient. The order condition requires counting 
included and excluded variables in each equation. An equation is considered to be 
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identified if the number of excluded predetermined variables in the equation is greater 
than or equal to the number of included endogenous variables minus 1. In other words, 
an equation is identified if it contains information that is not included in another equation. 
Equations (13) to (18), and therefore the entire system, meet the order condition. More 
precisely, the system of equations (13) to (18) is over-identified, given that it has extra 
restrictions beyond the minimum necessary to be identified. 
The identification problem is fully addressed if the rank condition is satisfied as 
well. The rank condition requires that no linear combination of the other equations in the 
system can produce the i-th equation. For the system of simultaneous equations (13) to 
( 18) the rank condition is satisfied, and this is sufficient for the identification problem. 
6.3 Estimated Findings 
This section reports the current study's empirical findings separately for the tax 
share and the tax rate equations. The data set used is a panel consisting of fifty states 
over a twenty-one year period for a total of 1050 observations. The summary statistics 
for all the variables used in this analysis are reported in Table 5. The descriptive 
statistics uncover some interesting information regarding the states' reliance on the three 
taxes. For instance, the maximum reliance on the general sales tax is 61.64 percent 
(Washington, 1989), while the highest general sales tax rate is at 7 percent (Rhode 
Island). Similarly, the highest reliance on personal income tax is 69.45 percent, while the 
highest personal income tax rate is 26.5 percent (Oregon, 1999). The descriptive 
statistics in Table 8.1 also reveal the highest state reliance on corporate income tax, 39 .32 
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percent (Alaska, 1980) and the highest corporate mcome tax rate -- 12 percent 
(Michigan). 
In terms of industrial mix, the descriptive statistics shown in Table 5 uncover 
some interesting information regarding the percentage of state employment by seven 
industries. For instance, North Dakota leads in the percentage of farm employment 
(22.01 percent) while Rhode Island's share of the farm employment is the lowest of all 
(0.32 percent). Wyoming has the highest share of the mining employment (19.93 
percent). The highest employment shares in construction, 13.65 percent (Alaska, 1983), 
manufacturing, 50.38 percent (Rhode Island), and transportation, 14.75 percent, (Alaska, 
1979) are also presented in Table 5. The employment shares in the trade sector range 
from 23 .2 percent (South Carolina, 1979) to 42.96 percent (Maryland, 1981 ). The 
employment share of the finance sector ranges from 3.92 (West Virginia, 1979) to 13.7 
percent (Delaware, 1997) with an average of 6.46 percent. 
With respect to state demographic characteristics, the descriptive statistics show a 
marked difference in state per capita spending - starting from $682.28 (Florida, 1979) to 
$9,912.12 (Alaska, 1999), with an average state per capita spending of $2,403.14. 
Similarly, the percentage of state prime-age population ranges from 54.63 percent 
(Mississippi, 1989) to 76.39 percent (Alabama, 1980) with an average of 60.94 percent. 
State median income ranges from $ 17,672 (Mississippi) to $ 75,505 (Connecticut) with 
an average median income being at$ 11,720.03. 
Interesting statistics are uncovered regarding the neighboring states' highest 
personal and corporate income tax shares. For instance, Nevada borders the state with 
the maximum personal income tax share in the nation (Oregon), while Vermont borders 
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the state with the maximum corporate income tax share in the continental U.S. (New 
Hampshire). 
In order to explore the strength of linear association among the variables, 
correlation analysis of six equations is performed. The correlation coefficients between 
the variables and their respective probability values are presented in Table 6. In 
particular, the correlation coefficients presented in Table 6 quantify the direction and the 
magnitude of correlation among the chosen variables. The results suggest that a 
significant correlation exists among the employment shares of some of the industries. 
For instance, the employment shares of the construction and the manufacturing sectors 
are significantly correlated with the employment shares of all other sectors. On the other 
hand, no significant correlation is found between the employment share of the 
agricultural and trade sectors or between the finance and transportation sectors. A 
significant correlation between state population and employment share is also found. 
Given that industrial employment depends highly on the labor supply, this correlation 
should not come as a surprise. Furthermore, the results suggest no significant correlation 
between the political costs of either income tax. However, a significant correlation is 
found to be present between the two political cost variables that determine state reliance 
on general sales taxes. Similarly, the correlation coefficients of political party variables 
suggest a negative correlation between Republican Party control over state houses and the 
levels of state general sales tax and personal income tax rates. Similarly, a negative 
correlation between Republican Party control over the state senates and state personal 
income tax rates exists. These and some other correlations between the variables 
employed by the current study are presented in Table 6. 
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In addition to the above-mentioned statistics, this chapter reveals the current 
study's empirical findings. These findings are broken down separately for the tax share 
and the tax rate equations. The baseline results obtained from the 3SLS are discussed in 
the following sections. These baseline results for the tax hares and tax rates are reported 
in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. 
6.4 The Results for Tax Share Equations (13) to (15) 
The following section examines the effects of political cost forces on general 
sales, on personal income and on corporate income taxes. Furthermore, this section 
presents the effects of industrial mix and state demographic characteristics on the three 
tax shares, and the effects that interstate tax competition has on a state's tax mix choice. 
The baseline results for tax share equations are obtained from 3SLS and are reported in 
Table 7. 
6.4.1 The Effects of Political Costs on Tax Shares 
The empirical results indicate that political costs play different roles in the three 
kinds of taxes. As expected, the political cost for the general sales tax is negative and 
significant with respect to the personal income tax (Political Cost GST/PID, Table 7. 
This implies that if more revenue is raised from a potential general sales tax base relative 
to the alternative personal income tax base, political opposition will increase from those 
on whom the general sales tax will fall. Government officials can therefore anticipate 
potential political opposition and take steps to minimize their reliance on general sales 
taxes. 
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The opposite result is obtained regarding the political cost for a general sales tax 
with respect to the alternative corporate income tax (Political Cost GST/CIT). The 
coefficient estimate on this political cost proxy implies that, if faced with an option of 
choosing between heavier reliance on general sales taxes or alternative corporate income 
taxes, policymakers would benefit from choosing the general sales tax. The argument 
can be made that, if this proxy indeed reflects the political costs, government officials 
may expect high political costs if they increase their state's reliance on corporate income 
tax. Therefore, the least costly strategy is increased reliance on the general sales tax. 
Thus, the formation of a "business friendly environment" involving lower reliance on the 
corporate income tax could potentially be the least costly strategy for policymakers. At 
the same time, government officials tend to take advantage of the general sales tax 
source. One such advantage is a low administrative cost for general sales taxes. 
Additionally, the results obtained by the current study suggest low political costs of 
general sales tax, at least relative to the corporate income tax. 
Further results regarding the political cost proxies suggest no significant effect of 
alternative general sales tax bases on corporate income tax reliance (Political Cost 
CIT/GST). However, the previous findings of low general sales tax political costs 
relative to the corporate income tax are consistent with the findings of no political costs 
regarding corporate income tax relative to the general sales tax. The argument can be 
made that policymakers do not expect high political costs from greater reliance on 
general sales tax relative to corporate income tax. The least costly policy could be 
facilitating private sector investment activities by not increasing their state's reliance on 
the corporate income tax. 
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The result regarding the political cost for the corporate income tax with respect to 
the alternative personal income tax base (Political Cost CIT/PIT) suggests a negative 
effect of this political cost proxy on the corporate income tax (Table 7). A negative sign 
on this political cost proxy implies a rise in political opposition if a state increases 
reliance on corporate income tax sources versus personal income tax sources. Given that 
both are taxes on income and not on consumption, this finding can suggest that 
policymakers should carefully balance state reliance on these two income tax sources. In 
other words, given the criticism that business investment is taxed twice with income 
taxes, a rational evaluation of the tax system might increase policymakers' chances for 
reelection. The argument can be made that rational evaluation of a state's reliance on 
both personal income tax and corporate income tax sources may reduce the need for state 
officials to go to the voters to increase tax rates, which is politically undesirable (Hy & 
Waugh, 1995). 
Finally, the political costs of the personal income tax with respect to the 
alternative general sales tax base (Political Cost PIT/GST) and with respect to the 
alternative corporate income tax base (Political Cost PIT/CIT) are not found significant 
determinants of a state's choice of tax revenue portfolios. 
In summary, the obtained results suggest high political costs of the general sales 
and corporate income taxes relative to the personal income tax. These findings reflect the 
underlining growth trend of the three tax sources which, in tum, affects the changes in 
potential tax bases. Therefore, the implication of the results is that relatively more stable 
sources (personal income tax) are relied upon more extensively. The importance of tax 
stability has been widely analyzed in economic literature. For example, Fox and 
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Campbell ( 1984) examined the income elasticity of ten categories of sales tax revenue. 
They found the sales tax to be a highly unstable source as its elasticity falls in recession 
and rises in expansions. Similarly, Hettich and Winer (1984) argue that states tend to 
rely less heavily on tax sources that are more variable. The argument is that dependence 
on the relatively unstable tax source increases the tax burden relative to the costs of 
organizing opposition and thus decreases a state's reliance on particular tax source. 
6.4.2. The Effects of Industrial Mix and State Demographic Characteristics on Tax 
Shares 
The purpose of this section is to present the estimated impacts of different 
economic activities on state tax revenue mixes. The baseline results, presented in Table 
7, support the earlier hypothesis number two. The argument was made that state tax 
revenue portfolios depend upon characteristics of a state's private economy and the 
dominance degree of a particular sector.23 The examined industries can be divided into 
three categories: (i) industries that affect state tax mix by affecting only one tax source; 
(ii) goods-producing industries; and (iii) service-producing industries that affect more 
than one tax source. 
The agricultural, construction and trade sectors all belong to the first category -
industries that affect state tax mix by impacting only one tax source. The dominance of 
the agricultural (Farm) and construction (Construction) sectors intensify a state's reliance 
on the personal income tax while dominance of the trade sector (Trade) lowers a state's 
23 See Musgrave (1979), Tait, Gratx and Eichengreen' s (1979), McLure (1967, 1981 ), White 
( 1986) and Merriman and Skidmore ( 1997). 
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reliance on the corporate income tax. In particular, an increase in the agricultural sector's 
employment share stimulates 0.339 percent higher reliance on the personal income taxes. 
This finding is consistent with Lewis (1976), who found a positive effect regarding an 
increase of farm sector's employment on income tax reliance in Pakistan. Furthermore, a 
significant role of the construction sector in determining state tax revenue mix is 
suggested by the findings presented in Table 7. The results imply the propensity to 
increase state reliance on personal income taxes by 0.601 percent as the construction 
sector becomes more dominant. Finally, the trade sector appears to contribute to 
variation in the corporate income tax but not in the general sales and personal income 
taxes. The results suggest that states appear to use corporate income taxes less 
intensively (0.309 percent) as the trade sector becomes more dominant. 
The second group of industries -- goods-producing -- consists of the mining and 
manufacturing sectors. A dominance of the mining sector (Mining) intensifies a state's 
reliance on the general sales tax and lowers reliance on the corporate income tax. More 
precisely, a 1.0 percent increase of the employment share in mining sector enhances a 
state's reliance on the general sales taxes by 0.964 percent and decreases reliance on the 
corporate income tax by 0.407 percent. The manufacturing sector (Manufacturing) also 
seems to contribute to variation in a state's reliance on the general sales and personal 
income taxes. The results suggest that a 1.0 percent increase in the manufacturing 
sector's employment share leads to a 0.291 percent higher reliance on the general sales 
tax and a 0.213 percent lower reliance on the personal income tax. Lewis (1976), who 
analyzed the revenue implications of changing industrial structure in Pakistan, also 
obtained a positive and significant effect of the manufacturing sector on the general sales 
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tax. Similarly, the finding of lower reliance on the personal income taxes is consistent 
with Rork's (2000) work. Rork argues that this particular result indicates "a high 
concentration of low wage earners in the manufacturing sector that results in a larger part 
of the population falling into lower income brackets of progressive state." 
Given that both manufacturing and mining sectors are considered to be "goods-
producing" sectors, the baseline results suggest that states appear to use the sales taxes 
more intensively when these industries become more dominant. Conversely, with respect 
to the income taxes, it appears that states lessen their reliance on these two taxes as the 
employment share in manufacturing (PIT) and mining (CIT) sectors increase. This can 
suggest that states recognize a fair immobility of the mining and (somewhat) 
manufacturing sectors and substitute higher general sales taxes for the personal income 
and corporate income taxes. 
Finally, the third set of industries, service-producing ones, consists of the 
transportation and finance sectors. The dominance of the transportation sector 
(Transportation) enhances the use of the income taxes and lessens the reliance on the 
general sales taxes. More precisely, the results suggest that a one percent increase in 
employment share in the transportation sector leads to higher reliance on the personal 
income (0.52 percent) and corporate income taxes (0.384 percent) and lower reliance on 
the general sales tax (0.91 percent). Given that the transportation sector is considered to 
be a service-producing sector, the results reveal a practice of using the corporate income 
tax for collecting revenue from transactions within this particular service-producing 
sector. Regarding the effects of the transportation sector on the general sales tax, many 
tax analysts have suggested that expanded tax exemptions for service-producing sectors 
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have gradually narrowed the general sales tax base and thus made this tax source less 
productive (Fox, 1998). 
The finance sector's dominance (Finance) contributes to variations m mcome 
taxes by boosting the reliance on the corporate income tax and bringing down the reliance 
on the personal income tax. In particular, an increase in the finance sector's employment 
share leads to a higher reliance on the corporate income tax (0.582 percent) and lower 
reliance on the personal income tax (1.4 percent). The opposite responsiveness of the 
two income taxes concerning the growth of the finance sector suggests that states 
substitute high corporate income for the personal income taxes, at least in the case of the 
finance sector's dominance. These results are consistent with Hansen's (1983) argument 
that corporate income taxes are generally designed to capture some portion of 
corporations' wealth. 
State income per capita, prime age, population and expenditures per capita are 
additional determinants of a state's tax revenue mix. One would expect a state's tax 
revenue composition to depend on the amount of income earned within its borders. The 
baseline results suggest that state's per capita income does not appear to be a significant 
determinant of any tax source in question. This is a somewhat surprising finding given 
the expectation that if personal income is higher, more taxable and more disposable 
income becomes available. However, this particular finding is consistent with previous 
work such as the study by Tait, Gratx and Eichengreen (1979). These authors also found 
no significant correlation between income and tax shares in sixty-three developing 
countries. 
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With respect to a state's working population, this study finds no significant effect 
of an increase in state's working population on the three tax shares. Therefore, Metcalf' s 
(1993) findings cannot be supported in this study. 24 On the other hand, it appears that the 
higher spending states rely less on all three taxes. For instance, a $100 increase in a 
state's expenditure per capita negatively affects state reliance on the general sales and 
corporate income taxes (0.2 percent) and personal income taxes (0.1 percent). The 
argument for a negative coefficient on state expenditure can be that the current study 
considers the three tax sources (general sales, personal income and corporate income 
taxes) all of which comprise about seventy-five percent of states own tax sources. These 
three tax sources do not constitute all of the states tax revenue, and it could be that these 
other sources drive the results (Feenberg & Rosen, 1987). One can argue that high 
spending states, in order to collect revenue for government programs, collect their 
revenue from sources other than general sales, personal income and corporate income 
taxes. 
State population appears to have different effects on the three tax revenue sources 
and the resulting tax revenue mix. The results suggest that highly populated states have a 
propensity to increase their reliance on the general sales taxes. On the contrary, no 
significant effect of state population was found on either personal income or corporate 
income taxes. 
24 Metcalf s (1993) findings suggest that a state's prime working age residents prefer fewer taxes 
collected from general sales and personal income taxes. 
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6.4.3 The Effects of Tax Competition Variables on Tax Shares 
The empirical results obtained the current study suggest that the neighboring 
states' tax revenue mixes affect the home states' tax revenue mixes. The coefficient 
estimates on the lowest general sales tax shares (Neigh. Min GST) suggest a tendency to 
lower the home state reliance on the general sales taxes by 0.123 percent because of 
neighboring states' general sales tax policy. It appears that the interstate tax competition 
between geographic neighbors as well as the rise of electronic commerce are increasing 
the pressure to keep state reliance on general sales taxes as low as possible. The results 
indicate that states try to undercut their neighbor with the lowest general sales tax share. 
The need to keep general sales taxes lower than that of the neighbor's is enhanced by the 
cross-border shopping phenomenon (Kenyon & Kincaid, 1991; Kanbur & Keen, 1993) as 
well as purchasing opportunities offered by the Internet. This particular finding is 
consistent with Goolsbee ( 1998), who argues that the lower general sales taxes have 
significant effects on Internet purchases as well as on some coordination of tax policies 
among the states. 
The estimated effects of neighboring states' highest personal income tax share 
(Neigh. Max PIT) on a home state's choice of tax revenue portfolio suggest the tendency 
to follow the neighbor with the highest personal income tax share by increasing the home 
state personal income tax by 0.057 percent. The argument can be made that if 
government officials use the neighbor with the highest personal income tax share as a 
"benchmark" for their own reliance on personal income tax, then any changes in their 
neighbors reliance on this tax source will stimulate changes in the home state's tax mix. 
Politically speaking, as neighbors increase their reliance on personal income tax, 
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policymakers in the home state can remind their electorate of such action, and advocate 
an increase in their home state's own reliance on personal income tax as a way of 
obtaining higher level of public goods and services. 
The findings of the current study suggest no significant effect of the neighbors 
highest corporate income tax share (Neigh. Max CIT) on home state reliance on the same 
tax source. Therefore, no support for the hypothesis of interstate tax competition based 
on state reliance on corporate income tax is provided. 
Furthermore, the baseline results suggest positive effects of a state's tax rates on 
state reliance on their respective tax sources. One percent increases in each tax rate (the 
general sales, personal income and corporate income tax rates) are expected to intensify a 
state's reliance on their tax shares by 0.554, 0.184 and 0.47 percent, respectively. As 
predicted by the theory, a higher tax rate will result in higher tax shares. 
6.5 The Results for Tax Rate Equations (16) to (18) 
This section presents the results obtained from estimating the determinants of 
states' own tax rates using 3SLS techniques. The results for general sales tax rate, 
personal income tax rate and corporate income tax rate are presented in Table 8. 
6.5.1 The Results for Interdependence among Home Tax Rates 
The interdependence among a state's own general sales tax, personal income tax 
and corporate income tax rates is tested in this study -- hypothesis number five. The 
results suggest a significant interdependence between the general sales ( GST Rate) and 
corporate income tax rates (CIT Rate). The findings presented in Table 8 indicate that the 
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general sales tax rate and the corporate income tax rate have a complementary 
relationship. More precisely, a one percent increase in the corporate income tax rate 
enhances a 0.025 percent rise in the general sales tax (GST Rate equation) and a one 
percent rise in the general sales tax rate stimulates a 0.244 percent rise in the corporate 
income tax rate ( CIT Rate equation). 
Furthermore, the results suggest a positive and significant effect by the corporate 
income tax rate on the personal income tax rate (PIT Rate equation). The 
interdependence between the two income tax rates suggests that a one percent increase in 
a state's corporate income tax rate boosts a state's personal income tax rate by 0.281 
percent. No significant effect of the general sales tax rate level on the level of the 
personal income tax rate ( or vice versa) is found. 
6.5.2. The Effects of Previous Reliance on Taxes 
The estimated effects of a state's previous reliance on general sales tax (GST Lag) 
and personal income tax (PIT Lag) suggest a positive and significant effect on a state's 
general sales tax rate and personal income tax rate, respectively. In particular a 0.025 
percent increase in the general sales tax rate and 0.349 percent increase in the personal 
income tax rate is implied if a state's reliance on these tax sources went up. These 
findings are consistent with some previous work that argues that the best tax rate 
determinant is the state's previous reliance on these particular taxes (Penniman, 1971 ). 
In terms of a state's previous reliance on the corporate income tax (CIT Lag), the 
estimated effects suggest a reduction in the corporate income tax rate by 0.052 percent if 
a state's previous reliance on corporate income tax increased. 
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6.5.3 The Effects of Border Market on Tax Rates 
Measures of the border market magnitude served by the home state are employed 
as the determinants for the general sales tax rate, personal income tax rate and corporate 
income tax rate. The coefficient estimates on the percentage of home border population 
(Home Border Pop) indicate that as home border population increases, a state's general 
sales tax and personal income tax rates decrease. More precisely, a one percent increase 
in the home state border population is estimated to reduce the state general sales tax rate 
by 0.028 and the personal income tax rate by 0.161 percent. The argument can be made 
that as more people reside in bordering counties, home states try to prevent these 
residents from cross-border shopping by lowering their own general sales tax rates. In 
addition, policymakers also tend to reduce state personal income tax rates in order to 
prevent possible out-migration. The finding of a general tendency for lower general sales 
and personal income tax rates when a high percentage of home state population lives on 
or near the state's border supports the argument of the importance of cross-border effects. 
The estimated effects of neighboring states' border population (Neigh. Border 
Pop) suggest that it has a positive effect on the general sales tax rate and a negative effect 
on two income taxes in home state. A one percent increase in neighbors border 
population is expected to raise a home state's general sales tax rate by 0.027 percent and 
lower the personal income and corporate income tax rates by 0.285 and 0.102 percent, 
respectively. The argument can be made that by increasing the general sales tax rate, 
home states aim to collect more general sales tax revenue from non-residents. These 
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results also provide strong support for tax competition that is consistent with work of 
Kanbur and Keen (1993). 
As suggested by Case, Hines and Rosen ( 1989), the percentage of state income 
earned in bordering counties of the home state (Home Border Income) and the percentage 
of income earned in neighboring states' border counties (Neigh. Border Income) are 
employed to capture policymakers considerations, if any, of changes in income earned by 
the bordering counties. The estimated effects of the HomeBorder Income variable on a 
state's general sales and corporate income tax rates suggest higher tax rates when more 
income is earned by the home state's bordering counties. A one percent increase in 
income earned by the bordering counties is expected to increase the general sales tax rate 
by 0.031 percent and the corporate income tax rate by 0.15 percent. These findings 
suggest that the home state's government officials take into consideration bordering 
counties' income when determining these two tax rates. 
With regard to the effect of income earned by neighboring states' bordering 
counties (Neigh. Border Income), the results suggest that income earned in these counties 
does not have a significant effect on the home state general sales tax rate or personal 
income tax rate. However, an increase in the income earned by the neighbors' bordering 
counties will decrease the home state's corporate income tax rate by 0.197 percent. 
6.5.4 The Effects of Political Party Membership on Tax Rates 
Earlier in this study, it has been hypothesized that party control of the state House, 
Senate and Governorship plays an important role in determining state tax policy. The 
coefficient estimates on the Republican Party control over the state House (HRep) 
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suggest no significant effect on the general sales tax rate, personal income tax rate nor 
corporate income tax rate. Furthermore, the estimated effects of the Republican Party 
control over the Governorship (GRep) imply that, if a state Governor is a member of the 
Republican Party, a lower general sales tax rate and a higher personal income tax rate can 
be expected. Although the Republican Party is perceived to support regressive taxes, 
these somewhat different findings can be explained by the fact that voters of the entire 
state elect a Governor (as opposed to the district-specific candidates like House and 
Senate representatives). Hence, the Governor must address the preferences of all income 
groups and not follow his/her political party preferences. Likewise, the argument can be 
made that liberal Republicans dominate the data used in this study and therefore drive the 
results. This argument is similar to Hansen's (1983) who debates that "many Northern, 
Midwestern, or Western states adopted progressive income taxes under Republican 
governors" (Hansen, 1983, pp. 428). However, with respect to corporate income tax rate, 
this study finds no significant effect of a state Governor's party affiliation on the level of 
a state's corporate income tax rate. 
The coefficient estimates of the Republican Party's control over the state Senate 
(SRep) suggest that if members of the Republican Party do control the Senate, a lower 
personal income tax rate and a higher corporate income tax rates can be expected. The 
traditional view that conservatives prefer lower personal income taxes is also supported 
by the results of this study. The empirical results indicate no significant effect of the 
Republican Party's control over the state Senate on the level of the general sales tax rate. 
A different result is obtained when members of the Republican Party control all 
three (House, Senate and Governorship) branches. In particular, the coefficient estimates 
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on the Republican Party's political power variable (SHG) suggest no significant effect on 
state choice of either a personal income or corporate income tax rates. On the other hand, 
the results suggest higher general sales tax rates when the Republican Party controls all 
three branches and therefore has political power (Table 8). This finding is consistent 
with the traditional view that members of the Republican Party prefer higher general 
sales taxes; i.e., more regressive taxes. 
6.5.5 The Effects of Interstate Tax Competition on Tax Rates 
This study analyzes the existence of interstate tax competitions among geographic 
neighbors and around state tax rates. In that context there were two hypotheses presented 
earlier in the study. One is hypothesis number three that argues for a negative 
relationship between neighboring states' general sales tax rate and the home state's 
general sales tax rate. The empirical analysis specifies the interstate tax competition, 
which is based on the general sales tax rate, to be around the lowest general sales tax rate 
available in the neighboring states. The second hypothesis (number four) argues for a 
positive relationship between the income taxes of neighboring states and the home state. 
In terms of tax competition, the interstate tax differentials are qualified by assuming tax 
competition that is based on the highest personal income tax rate and the highest 
corporate income tax rate available in neighboring states. 
The coefficient estimates on the neighboring states' general sales tax rate (Neigh. 
Min GST Rate) suggest no significant effect on the home tax rate. This does not support 
hypothesis number three that argues that states undercut neighbors with the lowest 
general sales tax rate. Estimated effects of the neighbors' highest personal income 
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(Neigh. Max PIT Rate) and corporate income tax rates (Neigh. Max CIT Rate) on a state's 
own personal income tax rate also suggest no significant effect of either the Neigh. Max 
PIT Rate or Neigh. Max CIT Rate variable on the home state personal income tax rate. 
In terms of interstate tax competition, neighboring states' expenditures per capita 
(Neigh. Expenditure PC) is employed for the three tax rates. The results advocate that 
the neighboring states' expenditure per capita is not a significant determinant of any of 
the home state's tax rates. 
Generally, neighboring states' taxpayers engage in cross-border shopping at a 
certain cost. Travel costs estimated effects on the home state general sales tax rate 
indicate that as transportation costs increase, the general sales tax rate rises as well. 
Thus, the argument can be made that as the gap between the tax differential and travel 
costs narrows, the home state increases its general sales tax rate. Such a finding provides 
strong support for tax competition consistent with work of Kan bur and Keen (1993 ). 
6.5.6 The Effect of Income Level on State General Sales and Personal Income Tax 
Rates 
The coefficient estimates on the median income variable (Median Income) 
suggest a negative and significant effect of state median income on the general sales tax 
rate and personal income tax rate. The argument can be made that as a state's median 
income increases, the policymakers have a propensity to decrease two tax rates and likely 
impose new levies. These new levies can take the form of higher taxes ( other than 
general sales tax and personal income tax) or arise from the imposition of new forms of 
taxes, which are becoming increasingly popular. 
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The effect of households with high income (number of households that earn 
$100,000 or more, HH Income $/ 00K) is estimated in order to show their effect on 
personal income tax rate. The estimated effects of high-income households imply that 
state personal income tax rates increase as more high-income households reside in a state. 
The argument can be made that as the number of households with high-income increases, 
the potential personal income tax base increases as well. Therefore, government officials 
expand their state's reliance on personal income tax by increasing the personal income 
tax rate. Given the popular belief that high-income earners are always able to avoid 
taxes, the argument can be made that policymakers consider this possibility while 
deciding on the level of the state personal income tax rate and consequently the state's 
reliance on personal income tax source. 
6.6. Summary of the Findings 
All of the findings presented in this section can be summarized as follows: 
1) Political costs play a significant role in determining state tax revenue portfolios. 
Particularly, if the political cost proxies indeed reflect voters' political opposition 
to particular taxation, the results imply high political costs for choosing higher 
general sales and corporate income taxes relative to personal income tax. On the 
contrary, low political costs of choosing general sales tax relative to corporate 
income tax are suggested by the results. 
2) State tax revenue portfolios depend on industrial mix of a state. Specifically, a 
rise of employment share of the mining and manufacturing sectors intensify the 
use of the general sales tax, while a dominance of the transportation sector lowers 
a state's reliance on general sales tax. Furthermore, the greater dominance of the 
finance and transportation sectors stimulate use of the corporate income tax, while 
a rise in the employment share in trade and mining sectors have a negative effects 
83 
on corporate income tax share. As the agricultural, construction and transpiration 
sectors become predominant, the reliance on personal income tax increase, while 
the dominance of the finance and manufacturing sectors lowers state's reliance on 
personal income tax. 
3) More populated states rely heavily on general sales taxes, while higher spending 
states rely less on the three taxes. 
4) Interstate tax competition based on state reliance on general sales and personal 
taxes is supported. However, there is no evidence that neighboring state's tax 
rates or expenditure per capita has an effect on the level of the home state tax 
rates. 
5) The interdependence between the general sales and corporate income tax rates is 
detected, as well as the interdependence between the income tax rates. 
6) A state's previous reliance on particular tax source is a significant determinant of 
the level of state's tax rates. Similarly, as the levels of the home state tax rates 
increase, the reliance on their respective taxes increases as well. 
7) An increase in the size of home border market (Home Border Pop) result in a 
tendency to lower general sales and personal income tax rates. However, as the 
size of the neighbors' border market increases (Neigh. Border Pop) the tendency 
to raise general sales and lower income tax rates emerges. The purchasing power 
of home state border market (Home Border Income) has a positive effect on 
general sales and corporate income tax rates in the home state. Nevertheless, as 
the purchasing power of the neighbors' border market increases (Neigh. Border 
Income), lower corporate income tax rate can be expected. 
8) The state general sales tax rates decrease with the Republican control of state 
Governorship and increase if the Republican Party has broader political power. 
Similarly, if the Governor is Republican, there is a tendency to increase the state 
personal income tax rate. Nevertheless, the personal income tax rate is expected 
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to decrease with Republicans' control over the state Senate. Finally, a state 
corporate income tax rate is expected to increase if members of the Republican 
Party control the state Senate. 
9) The level of median income induces lower general sales and personal income tax 
rates, while the number of high-income households stimulates a rise of the 
personal income tax rate. Finally, as the cost of cross-border shopping increase, 
higher general sales tax rates can be expected. 
6. 7. Robustness Checks 
The robustness of the baseline results presented in the previous section was tested 
by employing a couple of alternative model specifications. In addition to the three-stage 
least-squares method, the time-series, cross-section (TSCS) regression framework was 
utilized by the current study. More specifically, the two-way fixed effects model allows 
for the impact of a large number of factors that affect tax shares and tax rates, but are not 
explicitly included as explanatory variables.25 In particular, state specific and time 
effects are introduced to account for the constitutional, statutory, political, social, climatic 
and geographic differences between the states. The two-way fixed effects versions of 
equations (13) to (18) include dummy variables for each state with the base state being 
Alabama. Similarly, to account for changes over the time period, this model includes 
dummy variables for each year, with the base year being 1979. The choice of Alabama 
and 1979 as the base state and year is made for simplicity, given that these are the first 
state and the first year in the sample, respectively. The difference between the two-way 
25 The appropriateness of the fixed-effects model vs. random effects model was tested by 
obtaining the Hausman m-statistic, which tests the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
effects variables and the regressors. The test results rejected the null hypothesis and suggest that 
the fixed-effects model is more appropriate. 
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fixed effects ordinary least squares and the baseline model is the inclusion of time and 
state specific effects. However, the two-way fixed effects ordinary least squares does not 
account for endogeneity between the independent variables but allows for the effect of 
omitted variables to be considered. 
The results obtained from the two-way fixed effects ordinary least squares 
(TSCS) regression are presented in Table 9.1 for tax share equations and Table 9.2 for tax 
rate equations. The results suggest very few differences between the baseline and the 
TSCS results. Most of these variations occur with respect to a state's reliance on the 
personal income tax. The TSCS results suggest a higher reliance on personal income 
taxes if the mining sector becomes more dominant. On the other hand, the manufacturing 
and transportation sectors are no longer significant determinants of a state's reliance on 
the personal income tax. State expenditures per capita and the level of neighboring 
states' reliance on the personal income tax do not play a significant role in determining 
the level of personal income tax share. With regard to the corporate income tax share, the 
results from the TSCS analysis suggest that as state per capita personal income goes up 
by $ 100, a state reduces its reliance on the corporate income tax by 0.23 percent. 
A comprehensive specification of state tax rates presented in the baseline model is 
further enhanced in TSCS framework (Table 9.2). The results from this framework differ 
from the baseline model in several aspects. First, the interdependence between the 
general sales and corporate income tax rates cannot be supported by these new results. 
Furthermore, a new interdependence between the income taxes emerges. A one percent 
increase in the corporate income tax rate enhances lower personal income tax rates by 
0.192 percent, while a one percent increase in the personal income tax rate lowers the 
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corporate income tax rate by 0.023 percent. With regard to the importance of the border 
market, the home state border income is no longer an important determinant of the level 
of a state's general sales tax rate. Conversely, the new results suggest that the home state 
border income is a significant determinant of the personal income tax rate. Finally, the 
new results suggest that a state's pervious reliance on the corporate income taxes is not 
important for the level of its respective tax rate. However, an increase in the neighboring 
states' highest corporate income tax rate by one-percent will lower the home state 
corporate income tax rate by 0.061 percent. 
In summary, the results from the TSCS analysis suggest that if time period and 
state-specific effects are added to the model, the results vary slightly from the baseline 
model. Most of these variations occur in the personal income tax share and the corporate 
income tax rate equations, suggesting that these two specifications might be somewhat 
responsive to state- and time-specific effects. 
An additional test for omitted variable bias was performed in the current study. 
Given that the two-way fixed effects ordinary least squares (TSCS) analysis does not 
control for endogeneity, three-stage least-squares with time and state fixed effects (3SLS 
w/ TSCS) was employed as well. The obtained results are presented in Table 10.1 for the 
tax shares equations and Table 10.2 for the tax rate equations. The major difference 
between the baseline model and the three-stage least-squares with time and state specific 
variables is in the explanatory power of the independent variables. The results from the 
three-stage least-squares with time and state specific variables suggest robust statistical 
significance of explanatory variables. However, in terms of direction of effects, the new 
results suggest lower reliance on the personal income tax as mining and trade sectors 
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become more dominant. In particular, a one percent increase in employment of these two 
sectors will stimulate lower reliance on the personal income tax by 0.77 percent (mining) 
and 0.12 percent (trade). Another interesting finding suggests lower reliance on 
corporate income tax as its own tax rate increases. More precisely, as the corporate 
income tax rate increases by one percent, a 0.407 percent decline in a state's reliance on 
the corporate income tax can be expected. With regard to the results obtained from the 
tax rate equations (Table 10.2), the new results suggest that if the members of the 
Republican Party control state House, lower general sales tax rate can be expected. 
Similarly, new results suggest no significant interdependence between the two income tax 
rates. Furthermore, a state's previous reliance on the corporate income tax is not 
significant determinant of the corporate income tax rate. Overall, the results obtained 
from the three-stage least-squares analysis with time and state specific variables are much 
closer to the baseline results than the ones obtained from the TSCS model. The fact that 
the TSCS analysis did not control for the endogeneity of some independent variables can 
be a reason for such results. It appears that more appropriate robustness test for the 
omitted variables is the three-stage least-squares analysis with time and state specific 
variables included. 
Besides the issue of the omitted variables (TSCS specification), the question of 
sample construction arises as well. Therefore, a second check of the robustness of the 
baseline 3SLS model was employed. In particular, the same 3SLS method is employed, 
but now only for a subset of states. This subset includes only the states where all three 
taxes are present and make a significant contribution to the states' tax revenues. Twelve 
states are excluded from this sub-sample and these states are: Alaska, Delaware, Florida, 
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Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington and Wyoming. 
The 3SLS results for the subset of states are presented in Table 11 for tax share 
equations and Table 12 for tax rate equations. The results obtained for this new subset of 
states show the variations in reliance on three taxes with respect to a state's industrial 
mix. More precisely, the reliance on the general sales taxes is no longer influenced by 
the dominance of the manufacturing sector. However, the new results suggest that 
predominantly agricultural states rely less on the general sales tax. Furthermore, the 
reliance on the personal income tax is no longer affected by the dominance of the 
construction, manufacturing, transportation or finance sectors. Similarly, the mining, 
trade or finance sectors do not determine state reliance on the corporate income tax. 
With regard to other determinants of the tax revenue portfolios, the 3SLS results 
obtained for the subset of states suggest that home state expenditures per capita, the 
neighboring states' highest personal income tax share, own general sales and personal 
income tax rates are no longer important determinants of state tax revenue mixes. 
The majority of variations between the results obtained for the subset of states and 
the baseline results occur in the tax rate equations. For instance, the interdependence 
between the income taxes obtained by the TSCS analysis is also present for the 3SLS 
subset analysis but not for the baseline. In addition, new interdependence between the 
general sales and personal income tax rates is detected by the 3SLS subset analysis. 
Particularly, a one percent rise in the personal income tax rate is suggested to stimulate a 
rise in the general sales tax rate by 0.009 percent. In the case of a one percent rise in the 
general sales tax rate, a 1.62 percent rise in the personal income tax rate is expected. 
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Finally, in comparison to the baseline results, different kind of interdependence between 
the general sales and corporate income tax rates is detected by the 3SLS subset analysis. 
The baseline results suggested a same-direction movement between the two taxes. 
However, this result does not hold anymore given that the new results suggest a negative 
interdependence between the general sales and corporate income tax rates. 
Furthermore, the differences between the baseline and 3SLS subset results are 
detected with regard to the importance of the border market and policymakers' party 
membership. Neighboring states' border population is not an important determinant for 
the general sales and corporate income taxes, while their income has a negative effect on 
the level of home state general sales tax rate. With regard to the Political Party 
membership of the state House and Senate members, the 3SLS subset results suggest that 
as these two offices are controlled by the Republican Party, higher general sales tax rates 
can be expected. On the other hand, the party membership of the state Senate has no 
significant effect on the level of the income taxes. Similarly, the Governor's party 
affiliation is no longer an important determinant of the state personal income tax rate. 
Finally, the 3SLS subset results suggest that the Republican Party control of all three 
offices has no significant effect on the level of the general sales tax rate. 
Other differences between the baseline and the 3SLS subset results are also detected 
by the current study. Particularly, the level of state median income and the number of 
high-income households are no longer important for the level of the personal income tax 
rates. Also, the 3SLS subset results suggest that as the neighboring states' level of per 
capita expenditure goes up, lower corporate income tax rates can be expected. 
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In summary, the results from the 3SLS subset analysis suggest that the exclusion 
of those states whose reliance on the three taxes is not significant do change some of the 
baseline results. More precisely, forty-eight percent of the explanatory variables are no 
longer significant with this new specification. Therefore, the second check of robustness 
suggests differences between the baseline and the robustness tests associated with the 
sample construction. Even though some of the states do not impose the general sales tax 
or the two income taxes, their exclusion from the sample does not reflect the true 
preferences of their voters. In this particular case, the zero reliance on a particular tax is 
a meaningful and important value as it reflects the tax revenue portfolio chosen by a 
given state. Thus, the fact that many of the results obtained from the subset of states are 
not robust, does not necessarily reflect sample construction problems but rather the fact 
that sample size was significantly reduced and some meaningful values have been 
omitted. 
With regard to the tax competition effects, this study tested different 
specifications of tax competition among geographic neighbors. The approach was to 
employ the average general sales, personal income and corporate income tax shares and 
their average tax rates (Table 13 & 14). The empirical results suggest interstate tax 
competition among geographic neighbors to be based on the average reliance on the 
personal income taxes. In addition, the lowest general sales and the lowest personal and 
corporate income tax shares, as well as their respective tax rates, are utilized to test the 
presence of interstate tax competition (Table 15 & 16). The tax competition based on the 
lowest general sales tax is determined by the results, which supports the findings from the 
baseline model. However, no tax competition is determined between the neighbors with 
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the lowest income taxes and the home state. Similarly, the highest general sales and the 
highest income tax shares, as well as their respective tax rates, were employed in order to 
show the presence of tax competition (Table 17 & 18). The empirical results did not 
support competition based on the highest general sales or corporate income tax shares or 
their rates. However, the results do suggest that the neighbors' highest reliance on the 
personal income tax has a significant effect on state tax revenue portfolio. This finding is 
in line with the baseline results presented in Table 7. 
Besides the tests of importance of interstate tax competition, additional robustness 
tests are performed. In particular, the importance of policymakers' political party 
affiliation is tested by combining the HRep and SRep variables. The new variable, 
HSRep, identifies whether or not the Republican Party has control of the state House and 
Senate. The obtained results suggest lower general sales tax rate if the Republican Party 
controls a state legislature. This finding is not consistent with traditional view that 
conservatives are more likely to impose regressive taxes. These results are presented in 




Existing literature on tax revenue composition 1s very limited and primarily 
devoted to developing countries. This study extends the existing body of literature by 
focusing on the fifty United States. In particular, it offers explanation of the variations in 
the tax revenue mix and provides evidence that unifies the different political, economic 
and tax competition experiences of all fifty states. By specifically modeling three 
different sources of state tax revenue, the forces that shape state tax revenue portfolios 
are highlighted. The empirical results provide evidence that political factors, the 
production mix and tax competition determine the composition of state tax revenue. 
Given budget shortfalls and fiscal stresses on state governments today, many states need 
additional revenues to seal budget gaps. States' revenue proposals range from using 
rainy-day funds to raising taxes and fees. This study gives an analysis of the state tax 
revenue portfolios and disintegrates the influences of three main determinants of state tax 
revenues. The role of these determinants can provide important insight to policymakers 
when considering their state's tax revenue mixes. The results in this study present the 
ways of reversing the decline in the revenue productivity. Policymakers can achieve this 
by diversifying state tax revenue portfolios and looking closely at the political factors, 
state production mix and tax competition aspects of tax revenue composition. 
The current study develops a model of tax revenue composition based on a 
political economy framework developed by Hettich and Winer (1988). The empirical 
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evidence in this study supports the hypothesis that political costs are significant in 
determining state tax revenue mixes. Specifically, the results indicate higher political 
costs for choosing higher general sales and corporate income taxes relative to personal 
income taxes. In addition, a low political cost for choosing higher general sales tax 
relative to corporate income tax is suggested by this study. 
The hypothesis that a state's industrial mix matters received solid empirical 
support as well. The results indicate that reliance on a general sales tax is greater in 
states where the mining and manufacturing sectors are more dominant and less important 
in transportation-oriented states. However, the reliance on the personal income tax is 
more important in states where the agricultural, construction and mining sectors are 
predominant and less important in those states whose production mix is lead by the 
finance and manufacturing sectors. Finally, the corporate income tax is more important 
in states where the finance and mining sectors are more dominant and less important in 
trade and mining states. Therefore, this study provides evidence that production mix 
marks impact upon the revenue policies of the states. The results suggest different effects 
of different industries on state tax revenue mix. This implies that dominance by a 
particular sector can be an instrument in propelling tax revenue growth. 
The current study also contributes to the existing literature by considering tax 
competition in a rational choice framework. Prior studies failed to control for the effects 
that interstate tax competition has on tax revenue composition. Here a unique approach 
to tax competition is offered, hypothesizing that government officials compete with their 
neighbors for two reasons: they wish to remain in office, and they wish to increase their 
state's tax domain. The empirical results suggest that states try to undercut the 
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neighboring states with the lowest reliance on the general sales tax and try to follow the 
ones with the highest reliance on the personal income tax. However, similar conclusions 
about interstate tax competition based on tax rates could not be reached. 
The study also finds that general sales tax is more important for more populated 
states. On the other hand, the states with higher spending were found to rely less on all 
three tax sources. Similarly, evidence of interdependence among own tax rates and the 
importance of border markets is presented. Likewise, the influence of political party 
membership of state legislators on the level of state tax rates received solid empirical 
support. 
This study takes an initial step toward filling a lack of comprehensive 
characterization of the tax revenue composition of the fifty states. In addition to the 
above contributions, the present study is characterized by some limitations as well. The 
major limitation is the inability to model all components of tax revenue portfolios. The 
framework developed by this study does not consider other components of state tax 
revenue composition; e.g., components other than general sales, personal income and 
corporate income taxes. Since the three tax shares do not sum to one, the analysis does 
not provide the entire picture of a tax revenue portfolio and its determinants, but the 
current framework is capable of being extended to deal with other tax sources. 
Another limitation is the inability to model all relevant determinants of tax 
revenue composition. Besides political costs of collecting taxes, this study does not 
consider other costs of collecting tax revenue - administrative and compliance costs. 
Equity in a tax system is also not considered. An analysis that is more comprehensive 
would consider specific elements of each tax structure such as tax bases and exemptions. 
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Additional research is certainly needed to completely understand the factors that 
influence state tax revenue portfolios. 
The goal of this study was to present researchers and state policymakers with an 
analysis of a state's reliance on the three primary taxes. The empirical results uncover 
unique responses of tax portfolios to economic, political and tax competition 
developments. These three aspects of tax revenue portfolios affect the balance of state 
tax revenue and produce widespread state budget shortfalls. Therefore, state 
policymakers can utilize the findings of this study when analyzing their tax revenue 
compositions. State policymakers could stop the decline in revenue productivity if they 
look closely at the shifts in their industrial mixes and the political and tax competition 
aspects of their tax decisions. Therefore, the current study can serve in finding a better 
solution to states' budget problems. In particular, the results should help evaluate the 
reliance on particular tax source and develop new tactics that enable policymakers to 
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Individual Tax Shares for the United States during the 1979, 1989 and 1999* 
State 1999 1989 1979 
PIT GST CIT PIT GST CIT PIT GST CIT 
Alabama 31.60 27.30 3.90 29.03 26.82 5.89 20.77 31.32 5.76 
Alaska 0.00 0.00 23.40 0.02 0.00 32.61 14.21 0.00 31.47 
Arizona 27.80 43.90 7.20 22.49 45.36 4.93 17.83 46.46 5.89 
Arkansas 31.10 34.80 4.60 31.39 36.70 5.14 22.99 34.78 8.41 
California 42.50 31.30 7.50 38.37 30.89 12.28 29.10 34.61 14.52 
Colorado 46.90 28.50 5.00 43.83 25.86 5.89 31.72 35.75 7.79 
Connecticut 37.50 33.40 4.90 9.37 43.00 16.64 4.86 42.84 13.45 
Delaware 38.00 0.00 11.50 37.82 0.00 13.75 43.88 0.00 10.18 
Florida 0.00 58.30 5.30 0.00 61.32 5.82 0.00 45.37 7.33 
Georgia 45.70 34.90 6.40 43.04 31.92 8.27 29.79 36.50 9.24 
Hawaii 33.80 45.70 1.70 34.64 46.23 3.97 30.20 49.15 4.55 
Idaho 39.00 32.30 4.40 34.29 34.29 7.08 30.74 27.85 8.42 
Illinois 34.20 28.00 9.90 29.85 33.16 9.12 27.57 34.72 7.74 
Indiana 38.00 34.00 10.20 32.95 43.72 4.78 22.24 49.10 4.75 
Iowa 35.20 33.80 4.80 37.13 29.50 6.42 35.61 25.85 8.29 
Kansas 37.00 36.70 5.50 33.82 32.30 7.94 25.08 33.60 11.88 
Kentycky 34.40 28.40 4.20 27.53 25.88 7.70 21.98 28.87 7.87 
Louisiana 25.50 37.60 4.70 17.05 32.91 8.68 10.75 30.20 9.56 
Maine 40.10 32.60 5.80 35.92 32.51 6.06 20.30 35.68 7.44 
Maryland 44.10 24.30 4.30 42.85 24.32 5.34 37.99 26.41 5.50 
Mass a ch usetts 54.60 22.20 8.50 47.26 22.97 13.11 45.11 19.86 13.36 
Michigan 31.70 35.60 IO.IO 34.06 28.12 16.74 32.30 28.29 16.48 
Minnesota 42.50 27.30 6.20 39.02 27.76 7.62 40.08 19.40 11.38 
Mississippi 21.50 48.80 5.00 17.36 45.03 6.18 16.17 50.42 4.87 
Missouri 42.40 31.70 3.20 36.03 37.68 5.19 26.58 38.89 6.46 
Montana 35.40 0.00 6.60 36.48 0.00 7.71 35.35 0.00 9.01 
Nebraska 40.30 32.10 5.10 27.68 33.85 9.85 28.09 34.01 6.73 
Nevada 0.00 53.30 0.00 0.00 52.16 0.00 0.00 37.98 0.00 
New Hampshire 5.90 0.00 23.90 5.91 0.00 24.79 3.49 0.00 24.24 
New Jersey 37.40 29.90 7.90 27.58 30.05 12.47 23.28 29.45 11.53 
New Mexico 23.20 41.70 4.70 18.47 42.35 4.05 8.11 43.75 4.79 
New York 53.20 20.60 7.50 52.09 21.63 7.56 43.48 22.25 10.51 
North Carolina 45.60 23.20 6.40 41.13 23.09 10.71 34.18 22.24 8.74 
North Dakota 16.40 30.10 8.50 15.87 33.31 6.38 15.15 33.56 8.89 
Ohio 39.60 32.30 4.10 35.23 31.67 6.75 18.79 30.89 10.93 
Oklahoma 38.20 25.40 3.50 28.16 23.48 3.41 22.04 18.45 6.23 
Oregon 69.40 0.00 6.10 66.71 0.00 6.10 58.28 0.00 11.99 
Pennsylvania 29.70 30.80 7.10 24.22 32.35 9.26 22.89 27.95 12.59 
Rhode Island 40.20 29.60 3.50 9.10 34.03 3.66 28.54 29.41 10.39 
South Carolina 34.10 40.30 4.00 33.58 36.31 5.93 27.30 34.53 9.20 
South Dakota 0.00 53.20 5.90 0.00 49.87 5.66 0.00 53.16 1.18 
Tennessee 2.20 58.60 7.90 2.35 55.01 9.14 1.41 51.12 10.09 
Texas 0.00 51.00 0.00 0.00 49.71 0.00 0.00 38.08 0.00 
Utah 40.10 37.80 4.90 29.20 41.71 6.20 32.52 41.74 4.73 
Vermont 37.90 20.30 4.90 33.63 20.95 6.04 31.17 14.30 8.93 
Virginia 52.70 20.70 3.60 46.93 19.48 5.25 37.70 20.86 7.65 
Washinton 0.00 58.80 0.00 0.00 60.13 0.00 0.00 56.09 0.00 
West Virginia 29.20 28.50 8.40 24.44 30.25 10.79 18.90 48.91 2.23 
Wisconsin 44.40 28.10 5.80 7.29 29.47 3.22 42.18 25.14 10.04 
Wyoming 0.00 42.80 0.00 0.00 26.21 0.00 0.00 41.22 0.00 
United States 34.50 33.20 6.10 31.23 32.89 8.40 26.11 31.61 9.70 
• PIT, GST and CIT represent personal income tax, general sales tax and corporate income tax shares. 
The tax shares are calculated as shares of total revenues that were raised by the three taxes for 1979, 
1989 and 1999. 
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Table 2 . 
Variable Definitions for Tax Share Equations 
Matrix Variables Description 
Tax Share GST, PIT, CIT Three tax shares are identified for this category -- general sales tax share, personal income tax and 
corporate income tax share. 
Political Cost GST/PIT *Political costs for GST are the ratios of retail and service sales to state income ( Political Cost GST/PIT) 
Political Cost GSTICIT and to corporate income (Political Cost GST/CIT); 
Political Political Cost PIT/GST *Political costs for PIT are the ratios of state personal income to the retail and service sales (Political 
Costs Political Cost PIT/CIT Cost PIT/GST) and to corporate income (Political Cost PIT/CIT); 
Political Cost CIT/GST *Political costs for CIT are the ratios of corporate income to the retail and service sales ( Political Cost 
Political Cost CIT/PIT CIT/GST) and to state personal income (Political Cost CIT/PIT). 
Farm *Farm, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Trade, Transportation and Finance are the shares of 
Mining particular industry employment in state i. 
Economic Construction 
Charact Manufacturing *Income PC is personal income per capita in state i. 
eristics Trade .... 
0 Transportation *Population represents the population of state i. 
Finance 
Income PC *Expenditure PC is lagged state per capita expenditure. 
Population 
Expenditure PC *Prime Age is the percentage of state population that is prime working age. 
Prime Age 
Neigh. Min GST *For GST matrix contains Neigh. Min GST (the lowest GST share of state's geographic neighbors lagged 
Tax GST Rate by one year) and GST Rate (home state statutory GST Rate); 
Compel Neigh. Max PIT *For PIT matrix contains Neigh. Max PIT (the highest PIT tax share of state's geographic neighbors 
ition PIT Rate lagged by one year) and PIT Rate (home state effective personal income tax rate calculated as a ratio of 
Neigh. Max CIT personal income tax revenue and state's adjusted gross income); 
CIT Rate * For CIT matrix contains Neigh. Max CIT (the highest CIT share of geographic neighbors lagged by one 
year) and CIT Rate (the highest statutory CIT rate in the home state). 
Table 3. 
Variable Definitions for Tax Rate Equations 
Matrix Variable Description 
Tax GST Rate, PIT Rate, GST Rate, PIT Rate and CIT Rate variables for each tax source in question. These home state tax 
Rate CIT Rate rates are defined as described in Table 2 
HomeTax GST Rate, PIT Rate, * Home Tax Rates= [Tax Rateh] is the 1050 x 2 matrix composed of the observations on tax rates 
Rates CIT Rate other than i. 
Tax GST Lag, PIT Lag * Lagged GST share (GST Lag) for GST Rate equation; 
Share CIT Lag * Lagged PIT share (PIT Lag) for PIT Rate equation; 
* Lagged CIT share (CIT laR) for CIT Rate equation. 
Border Market Home Border Pop * Home Border Pop= percentage of home state population that reside in the bordering counties; 
Neigh. Border Pop * Neigh. Border Pop= percentage of neighbors' population that reside in counties that border home 
Home Border Income state; 
Neigh. Border Income * Home Border Income= percentage of home state income earned in bordering counties; 
* NeiRh. Border Income= percentage of neighbors' income earned in bordering counties. 
HRep * HRep = Republican Party controls House of Representatives, 
Political Party SRep * SRep = Republican Party controls state Senate; 
GRep * GRep = Republican Party controls the governorship; 
SHG * SHG = Republican Party controls all three offices. 
Neigh. Min GST Rate * Neigh. Min GST Rate is the lowest GST Rate available in the neighboring area (lagged); -- Neigh Neigh. Max PIT Rate * Neigh. Max PIT Rate is the highest PIT Rate available in the neighboring area (lagged); - bor Neigh. Max CIT Rate * Neigh. Max CIT Rate is the highest CIT Rate available in the neighboring area (lagged). 
Neigh. ExpenditurePC * Neigh. Expenditure PC is the average government spending of state's neighbors (lagged) used for 
income rates. 
Travel Travel Costs * Travel Costs contains the information on the cost of traveling between the bordering counties of 
Cost neighboring states for GST Rate. 
Income Median Income * Median Income is used in GST & PIT Rate equations. 
HHincome $/OOK * HHincome $/OOK is the percentage of households that earn $ 100,000 or more (Hhincl 00K). 
Table 4 . 
Data Source for Variables 
Matrix Source 
Tax Share * Data for personal income tax share, general sales tax share and corporate income tax shares are obtained from the State 
Government Tax Collections 1979-/999, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
Political * The data for the political costs ratios ( Political Cost GSTIPJT, Political Cost CST/CIT, Political Cost PIT/CST, Political Cost 
Costs PIT/CIT, Political Cost CIT/CST, Political Cost CIT/PIT) are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census, Economic Census. 
* The employment data for Farm, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation and Finance are obtained from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Economic * The data for Income PC, Population and Prime Age are obtained from Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. Department Characteristic 
s 
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
* The data for Expenditure PC are obtained from State Government Tax Collections 1979-/999, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census. 
* The data for Neigh. Min CST, Neigh. Max PIT, Neigh. Max CIT and Neigh. EXPPC are obtained from State Government Tax 
Tax Collections 1979-/999, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
Competition * The data for CST Rate, PIT Rate and CIT Rate are obtained from State Tax Handbooks, CCH Incorporated 1979-1999 and the 
Federation of Tax Administrators data bank. ...... 
N * The data for Neigh. Min CST Rate, Neigh. Max PIT Rate and Neigh. Max CIT Rate are obtained from State Tax Handbooks, CCH 
Incorporated 1979-1999 and the Federation of Tax Administrators data bank 
* The data necessary for calculating the CST Lag, PIT Lag and CIT Lag are obtained from State Government Tax Collections 
Tax 
1979-1999, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
Rates * The data for Home Border Pop, Neigh. Border Pop, Home Border Income and Neigh. Border Income are obtained form National 
Association of Cou/1/ies data bank and Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census 
*The data for Travel Cost are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census Master Tax Guide and Census Bureau, Geography Division 
* The data for the Political Party variables is obtained from the Political Reference Almanac from www.PoiiSci.Com 
* The data for the Income matrix are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Table 5. 
D S escnpbve tabsbcs 
Variable Name Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
GST share 31.324 14.328 0 61.638 
PIT share 27.422 15.905 0 69.449 
CIT share 6.966 4.614 0 39.324 
Political Cost GST/PIT 0.410 0.167 0.132 4.128 
Political Cost GST/CIT 699.862 840.145 0 17227.67 
Political Cost PIT/GST 2.535 0.578 0.242 7.572 
Political Cost PIT/CIT 1678.21 1677.83 0 39463.73 
Political Cost CIT/GST 0.0018 0.002 0 0.0353 
Political Cost CIT/PIT 0.007 0.0007 0 0.0137 
Farm 5.180 4.253 0.320 22.01 
Mining 14.355 2.530 0 19.936 
Construction 5.576 1.719 0 13.657 
Manufacturing 19.952 8.117 3.996 50.387 
Trade 27.455 2.325 21.980 42.964 
Transportation 6.374 1.570 0.726 14.752 
Finance 6.465 1.534 3.923 13.793 
Income Per Capita 17588.926 6038.457 6549.299 39542.599 
Population 4947751.22 5331325.29 403544 33145121 
Expenditure Per Capita 2403.14 1278.48 682.280 6912.120 
Prime Age 60.944 2.774 26.020 76.395 
Neigh. Min GST 24.291 8.322 0 60.229 
Neigh. Max PIT 40.216 13.509 0 69.449 
Neigh. Max CIT 9.308 4.332 0 26.975 
GST Rate 4.4096 1.7576 0 9.0 
PIT Rate 5.357 5.112 0 31.0 
CIT Rate 6.5451 2.633 0 12 
GSTLag 31.286 14.313 0 61.638 
PIT Lag 26.992 15.771 0 68.784 
CIT Lag 7.048 4.606 0 39.324 
Home Border Pop 40.496 23.3122 0 100.00 
Neigh. Border Pop 10.178 8.397 0 38.073 
Home Border Income 38.243 24.765 0 100.00 
Neigh. Border Income 14.741 14.594 0 62.605 
Neigh. Min GST Rate 3.538 1.176 0 6.500 
Neigh. Max PIT Rate 10.773 8.427 0 31.00 
Neigh. Max CIT Rate 8.158 2.410 0 12.00 
Neigh. Expenditure PC 1995.55 985.987 598.854 5621.19 
Travel Cost 11.552 6.348 0 39.190 
Median Income 38965.35 11720.03 17672.00 75505.00 
HH Income > IO0K 3.638 2.148 0 16.677 
House Republican 0.319 0.466 0 1.000 
Senate Republican 0.369 0.482 0 1.000 
Governor Republican 0.443 0.497 0 1.000 
SHG Republican 0.129 0.335 0 1.000 
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Table 6.1 Correlation Matrix for General Sales Tax Share 
Pol. Pol. Farm Mining Constr Manufa Trade 
Cost! Cost2 ction cturing 
Pol. I 
Cost! 
Pol. 0.518 I 
Cost2 (0.001) 
Farm 0.070 0.207 I 
(0.022) (0.001) 
Mining 0.025 -0.067 0.105 I 
(0.342) (0.038) (0.001) 
Constru 0.091 -0.067 -0.165 0.406 I 
ction (0.003) (0.032) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufa -0.049 0.088 -0.139 -0.403 -0.262 I 
cturing (0.167) (0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade 0.066 0.173 0.019 0.054 0.174 -0.312 I 
(0.030) (0.001) (0.517) (0.077) (0.001) (0.001) 
Transpo -0.001 -0.069 0.038 0.511 0.255 -0.447 0.316 
rtat (0.972) (0.203) (0.217) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Finance -0.107 -0.039 -0.389 -0.299 -0.116 -0.123 0.214 
(0.070) (0.196) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Populat -0.134 -0.105 -0.315 -0.195 -0.146 0.118 -0.088 
ion (0001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Persona -0.005 -0.013 -0.042 -0.016 -0.016 0.025 0.012 
Inc. (0.856) (0.669) (0.431) (0.587) (0.582) (0.409) (0.675) 
Prime 0,018 -0.009 0.003 0.033 0.005 -0.009 -0.003 
Age (0.546) (0.751) (0.915) (0.279) (0.868) (0.751) (0.901) 
Exp PC -0.030 -0.110 -0.305 0.119 0.027 -0.420 0.061 
(0.321) (0.00) (0.001) (0.279) (0.378) (0.001) (0.046) 
NMinG -0.004 0.026 0.096 -0.006 0.034 0.077 -0.136 
STs (0.878) (0.455) (0.001) (0.774) (0.263) (0.017) (0.001) 
GST -0.022 -0.063 -0.231 -0.254 -0.185 0.182 -0.106 
Rate (0.469) (0.242) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tarans Financ Populat Prime State Expend Nmax Gst 
port e ion Age Inc PC GSTs rate 
Trans I 
port 
Finan 0.033 I 
ce (0.283) 
Popul -0.099 0.285 I 
ation (0.001) (0.001) 
State -0.011 0.020 -0.002 I 
Inc (0.702) (0.497) (0.934) 
Prime -0.003 -0.010 0.004 0.007 I 
Age (0.922) (0.742) (0.876) (0.803) 
Exp 0.305 0.144 -0.066 -0.052 -0.014 I 
PC (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.087) (0.636) 
Nmax -0.320 -0.149 0.254 -0.003 -0.003 -0.250 I 
GSTs (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.920) (0.915) (0.001) 
GST -0.450 -0.068 0.202 -0.012 0.012 -0.134 -0.134 I 
Rate (0.001) (0.026) (0.001) (0.689) (0.677) (0.001) (0.001 
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Table 6.2 Correlation Matrix for Personal Income Tax Share 
Political Political Fann Mining Constru Manufac Trade 
Cost! Cost2 ction tu ring 
Pol I 
Cost! 
Pol -0.044 I 
Cost2 (0.145) 
Farm -0.210 0.221 I 
(0.00 I) (0.001) 
Mining -0.100 -0.088 0.157 I 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Construe -0.205 -0.105 -0.160 0.406 I 
tion (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufac 0.141 -0.064 -0.138 -0.403 -0.262 I 
I (0.001) (0.037) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade -0.138 0.146 0.019 0.060 0.174 -0.351 I 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.517) (0.077) (0.001) (0.001) 
Transpor -0.064 -0.047 0.Q38 -0.299 0.255 -0.477 0.322 
tat (0.129) (0.125) (0.216) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Finance 0.196 -0.016 -0.389 -0.299 -0.116 -0.123 0.214 
(0.001) (0.588) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Populati 0.318 -0.070 -0.315 -0.195 -0.146 0.118 -0.088 
on (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
SP 0.Q28 -0.005 -0.024 -0.016 -0.016 0.Q25 0.012 
Inc. (0.362) (0.850) (0.431) (0.587) (0.582) (0.409) (0.675) 
Prime -0.017 -0.016 0.003 0.033 0.005 -0.009 -0.003 
Age (0.576) (0.592) (0.915) (0.279) (0.868) (0.751) (0.901) 
Expen 0.042 -0.124 0.316 0.119 0.027 -0.420 0.061 
PC (0.167) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.378) (0.001) (0.046) 
NMaxPI 0.056 -0.036 0.035 -0.139 -0.011 0.031 -0.224 
Ts (0.065) (0.238) (0.142) (0.001) (0.702) (0.306) (0.001) 
PIT 0.084 0.072 -0.078 -0.356 -0.342 0.213 0.011 
Rate (0.006) (0.018) (0.01 I) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.714) 
Transp Finan Populat State Prime Expend Nmax PIT 
ortatio ce ion Inc. Age PC PITs Rate 
Transp 1 
ortat 
Financ -0.033 I 
e (0.283) 
Populat -0.099 0.285 I 
ion (0.001) (0.00 I) 
SP -0.011 0.020 -0.002 I 
Inc. (0.702) (0.497) (0.934) 
Prime -0.003 -0.010 0.004 0.007 I 
Age (0.922) (0.742) (0.876) (0.803) 
Expen 0.305 0.144 -0.069 -0.052 -0.014 I 
PC (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.087) (0.636) 
NMax -0.449 -0.076 0.178 -0.014 0.030 -0.199 1 
PITs (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.638) (0.328) (0.001) 
PIT -0.208 0.216 0.049 -0.005 -0.006 0.055 -0.047 I 
Rate (0.001) (0.001) (0.114) (0.857) (0.840) (0.073) (0.122) 
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T bl 63 a e C orre atlon atrax or t I orpora e ncome T Sh ax are 
Political Political Farm Mining Constru Manufa Trade 
Costl Cost2 ction cturing 
Politic I 
Costl 
Political -0.044 I 
Cost2 (0.145) 
Farm -0.210 0.221 I 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Mining -0.100 -0.088 0.157 I 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constru -0.204 -0.105 -0.160 0.406 1 
ction (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufa 0.141 -0.064 -0.138 -0.403 -0.262 1 
cturing (0.001) (0.037) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade -0.138 0.146 0.019 0.054 0.174 -0.351 I 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.517) (0.077) (0.001) (0.001) 
Transpo -0.046 -0.037 0.038 0.511 0.255 -0.477 0.384 
nation (0.129) (0.125) (0.216) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Finance 0.196 -0.016 -0.040 -0.299 -0.116 -0.123 -0.250 
(0.001) (0.588) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Populati 0.318 -0.070 -0.315 -0.195 -0.145 0.118 -0.088 
on (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
State 0.028 -0.005 -0.024 -0.018 -0.016 0.023 0.013 
Inc (0.362) (0.850) (0.431) (0.587) (0.582) (0.40) (0.675) 
Prime -0.017 (-0.016 0.003 0.033 0.005 -0.009 -0.003 
Age (0.576) (0.599) (0.915) (0.279) (0.868) (0.751) (0.901) 
Exp 0.042 -0.126 -0.345 0.119 0.027 -0.420 0.061 
PC (0.167) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.378) (0.001) (0.046) 
NmaxCI 0.048 -0.022 -0.118 -0.187 -0.020 0.381 -0.193 
Tshare (0.065) (0.471) (0.001) (0.001) (0.510) (0.001) (0.001) 
CIT 0.051 0.286 -0.029 -0.017 -0.117 -0.188 0.108 
Rate (0.052) (0.001) (0.334) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Transp Financ Populat State Prime Exp Nmax CIT 
ortat e ion Inc Age PC CITs Rate 
Transp I 
ortat 
Financ 0.033 I 
e (0.283) 
Populat -0.099 0.285 I 
ion (0.001) (0.001) 
State -0.011 0.020 -0.002 I 
Inc (0.702) (0.497) (0.934) 
Prime -0.003 -0.010 0.004 0.007 I 
Age (0.922) (0.742) (0.876) (0.803) 
Exp 0.305 0.144 -0.069 -0.052 -0.014 I 
PC (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.087) (0.636) 
Nmax -0.514 -0.065 0.000 -0.001 0.009 -0.300 I 
CITs (0.001) (0.034) (0.999) (0.971) (0.751) (0.001) 
CIT -0.030 0.092 0.084 0.018 -0.001 0.017 -0.042 1 
Rate (0.318) (0.001) (0.006) (0.541) (0.971) (0.571) (0.165) 
I 16 
Table 6.4 Correlation Matrix for General Sales Tax Rate 
PIT Rate CIT Rate NeighMi GST NeighEx Hborder Nborder 
nGST Lag pPC Pop Pop 
PIT Rate I 
CIT Rate 0.234 I 
(0.001) 
NeighMi -0.044 -0.059 I 
nGST (0.149) (0.053) 
GST -0.383 -0.238 0.016 I 
Lag (0.001) (0.001) (0.587) 
NeigExp 0.167 -0.073 0.060 -0.029 I 
PC (0.001) (0.017) (0.049) (0.343) 
Hborder -0.047 -0.228 0.047 -0.187 0.305 I 
Pop (0.123) (0.001) (0.123) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nborder -0.058 -0.008 0.047 0.011 0.152 0.144 I 
Pop (0.057) (0.771) (0.186) (0.712) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nborder -0.042 0.079 0.0538 -0.001 0.092 0.123 0.663 
Income (0.062) (0.009) (0.081) (0.951) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hborder -0.036 -0.120 0.043 -0.171 0.265 0.868 0.171 
Income (0.240) (0.001) (0.159) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Travel -0.026 -0.091 -0.059 0.252 0.391 -0.050 -0.0717 
Cost (0.397) (0.003) (0.054) (0.001) (0.001) (0.098) (0.020) 
Median 0.183 -0.031 -0.002 -0.103 0.717 0.037 0.0570 
Income (0.001) (0.305) (0.922) (0.001) (0.001) (0.220) (0.064) 
HRep -0.105 -0.001 -0.008 -0.132 0.198 0.164 -0.018 
(0.001) (0.959) (0.779) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.541) 
SRep -0.201 0.028 0.026 -0.041 0.162 0.045 0.014 
(0.001) (0.356) (0.387) (0.178) (0.001) (0.140) (0.627) 
GRep 0.041 0.037 0.028 -0.012 0.229 0.073 0.068 
(0.174) (0.218) (0.349) (0.674) (0.001) (0.017) (0.026) 
SHG -0.050 0.017 -0.058 0.178 0.178 -0.077 0.016 
(0.102) (0.570) (0.057) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.591) 
Nborder Hborder Travel Median HRep SRep GRep SHG 
Income Income Cost Income 
Nbord I 
Income 
Hborde 0.199 I 
Income (0.001) 
Travel -0.140 -0.073 I 
Cost (0.001) (0.0169) 
Median 0.043 0.052 0.163 I 
Income (0.160) (0.091) (0.001) 
HRep -0.136 0.164 0.240 0.113 I 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SRep -0.144 0.037 0.144 0.115 0.530 I 
(0.001) (0.220) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GRep 0.001 0.031 0.122 0.125 0.120 0.038 I 
(0.962) (0.310) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.207) 
SHG 0.092 -0.065 -0.056 -0.073 -0.048 -0.126 -0.222 I 
(0.002) (0.033) (0.067) (0.017) (0.113) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 6.5 Correlation Matrix for Personal Income Tax Rate 
GST err Neigh NExp PIT Hborder Nbord 
Rate Rate MaxPit PC Lag Pop Pop 
GST I 
Rate 
CIT -0.101 I 
Rate (0.001) 
Neigh -0.066 -0.114 I 
MaxPIT (0.031) (0.001) 
NExp 0.336 -0.073 0.091 I 
PC (0.001) (0.017) (0.003) 
PIT -0.262 0.236 0.021 0.198 I 
Lag (0.001) (0.001) (0.483) (0.001) 
Hborder 0.126 -0.228 0.345 0.305 -0.009 I 
Pop (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.748) 
Nbord 0.467 -0.008 -0.146 0.152 -0.034 0.144 I 
Pop (0.001) (0.771) (0.001) (0.001) (0.260) (0.001) 
Nbord 0.335 0.079 -0.025 0.092 -0.0316 0.123 0.663 
Income (0.001) (0.009) (0.402) (0.002) (0.304) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hbord 0.097 -0.120 0.430 0.265 -0.022 0.868 0.171 
Income (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.465) (0.001) (0.001) 
Median 0.219 -0.031 -0.024 0.717 0.199 0.037 0.057 
Income (0.001) (0.305) (0.436) (0.001) (0.001) (0.220) (0.064) 
HHs 0.043 0.105 0.046 -0.092 0.088 0.008 0.0177 
IOOK (0.156) (0.001) (0. 133) (0.002) (0.004) (0.777) (0.564) 
HRep -0.101 -0.015 0.254 0.198 -0.073 0.164 -0.0188 
(0.001) (0.959) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.541) 
SRep 0.020 0.028 0.021 0.162 -0.140 0.045 0.014 
(0.502) (0.356) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.141) (0.627) 
GRep 0.076 0.038 -0.080 0.229 0.040 0.073 0.068 
(0.012) (0.218) (0.005) (0.001) (0.191) (0.017) (0.026) 
SHG 0.176 0.017 -0.183 -0.068 -0.069 -0.077 0.016 
(0.001) (0.570) (0.001) (0.027) (0.023) (0.012) (0.591) 
Nborde Hborde Median HHs HRep SRep GRep SHG 
Income Income Income IOOK 
Nbord I 
Inc 
Hbord 0.199 I 
Inc (0.166) 
Median 0.0433 0.052 I 
Inc (0.160) (0.091) 
HHs 0.0680 0.032 0.200 I 
IOOK (0.027) (0.294) (0.001) 
HRep -0.136 0.164 0.113 -0.131 I 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SRep -0.144 0.037 0.115 -0.059 0.530 I 
(0.001) (0.220) (0.001) (0.052) (0.001) 
GRep 0.001 0.031 0.125 -0.062 0.126 0.038 I 
(0.962 (0.310) (0.001) (0.041) (0.001) (0.207) 
SHG 0.092 -0.065 -0.073 -0.035 -0.048 -0.126 -0.222 I 
(0.002) (0.033) (0.017) (0.252) (0.113) (0.001) (0.001) 
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T bl 6 6 a e . C orre a 100 atnx or If M . f'. C t I orpora e ncome ax ae T Rt 
GST PIT Rate Neigh NExp CIT Hborder Nborde 
Rate MaxCiT PC Lag Pop Pop 
GST I 
Rate 
PIT Rate -0.227 I 
(0.001) 
Neigh 0.173 0.009 1 
MaxCiT (0.001) (0.756) 
NExp 0.336 0.167 0.241 1 
PC (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CIT -0.050 0.014 -0.255 -0.133 I 
Lag (0.101) (0.643) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hborder 0.126 -0.047 0.265 0.305 0.017 I 
Pop (0.001) (0.123) (0.001) (0.001) (0.564) 
Nborder 0.467 -0.058 0.101 0.152 0.139 0.144 I 
Pop (0.001) (0.057) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nborder 0.335 -0.057 0.081 0.092 -0.018 0.123 0.663 
Income (0.001) (0.062) (0.008) (0.002) (0.544) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hborder 0.097 -0.036 0.181 0.265 0.047 0.868 0.171 
Income (0.001) (0.240) (0.001) (0.001) (0.124) (0.001) (0.001) 
HRep -0.101 -0.105 0.075 0.198 0.070 0.164 -0.018 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.541) 
SRep 0.020 -0.201 0.083 0.162 0.091 0.045 0.014 
(0.502) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.140) (0.627) 
GRep 0.076 0.041 0.155 0.229 0.024 0.073 0.068 
(0.012) (0.174) (0.001) (0.001) (0.428) (0.017) (0.026) 
SHG 0.176 -0.050 -0.100 -0.068 -0.065 -0.077 0.0166 
(0.001) (0.102) (0.001) (0.027) (0.033) (0.012) (0.591) 




Hborder 0.199 I 
Income (0.001) 
HRep -0.136 0.164 1 
(0.001) (0.001) 
SRep -0.144 0.037 0.530 1 
(0.001) (0.220) (0.001) 
GRep 0.0014 0.031 0.126 0.038 1 
(0.962) (0.310) (0.001) (0.207) 
SHG 0.092 -0.0656 -0.0488 -0.126 -0.222 I 
(0.002) (0.033) (0.113) (0.001) (0.001) 
119 
Table 7. 
Th ree-s tage L s east- iquares R e2 ress1on esu ts or ax R I i T Sh 
Variable GST (3SLS) PIT (3SLS) 
Intercept 41.517 19.94 
(4.90) (3.79) 
Political Costs GST/PIT -3.252*** 
(0.791) 
Political Costs GST/CIT 0.0009*** 
(0.00018) 
Political Costs PIT/GST -0.107 
(0.27) 
Political Costs PIT/CIT -0.001 
(0.00008) 
Political Costs CIT/GST 
Political Costs CIT/PIT 
Farm -0.247 0.339** 
(0.15) (0.152) 
Mining 0.964*** 0.0157 
(0.15) (0.158) 
Construction -0.082 0.601 *** 
(0.061) (0.142) 
Manufacturing 0.291 ** -0.2137*** 
(0.13) (0.616) 
Transportation -0.91 ** 0.520** 
(0.292) (0.269) 
Trade 0.005 0.117 
(0.103) (0.105) 
Finance -0.252 -1.40*** 
(0.226) (0.22) 
Population 4.68E-7** -8.29E-7 
(2.08E-7) (2. lE-7) 
Prime Age 1.582E-8 -7.49E-9 
(3. l lE-8) (3. l lE-8) 
State Personal Income PC -0.009 -0.012 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Expenditure PC -0.002*** -0.001** 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
Neighbors' Min GST Share -0.123*** 
(0.037) 
Neighbors' Max PIT Share 0.057** 
(0.028) 
Neighbors' Max CIT Share 
GSTRate 0.5547** 
(0.26) 
PIT Rate 0.184*** 
(0.035) 
CIT Rate 
The entnes are regression coefficients with standard errors m parenthesis. 





































Th ree-St age L s east- ,quares R egress1on esu s or ax a es R It i T R t 
Variable GST Rate PIT Rate 
Intercept 3.49 16.77 
(0.589) (4.12) 
Other Tax Rates I (PIT for GST rate and GST -0.001 0.197 
for income tax rates) (0.003) (0.24) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate 0.025** 0.281 ** 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.01) (0.127) 
Lagged Shares 0.025*** 0.349*** 
(0.003) (0.026) 
Neighbors' Tax Rate (The Lowest for GST rate -0.005 0.039 
and the Highest for inc. tax rates) (0.01) (0.035) 
Neighbors' Expenditure -0.00004 0.00002 
Per Capita (0.00004) (0.0003) 
Home Border -0.028*** -0.161* 
Population (percent) (0.01 I) (0.09) 
Neighbors' Border 0.027** -0.285** 
Population (percent) (0.01 I) (0.094) 
Neighbors' Border -0.032 -0.013 
Income (percent) (0.023) (0.173) 
Home Border 0.031** 0.086 
Income (percent) (0.015) (0.1 I) 
House Republican (HRep) -0.02 0.336 
(0.046) (0.371) 
Senate Republican (SRep) 0.012 -1.327*** 
(0.053) (0.37) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.073** 0.451** 
(0.02) (0.227) 
SHG Republican 0.059* 0.134 
(0.033) (0.298) 
Median Income -0.00004*** -0.0002*** 
(6.5E-6) (0.00005) 
Households with $ 100,000 or more 0.563*** 
(0.134) 
Travel Costs 0.029** 
(0.012) 
The entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
































T" S . C 1me- enes ross-S f R ec 10n e11:ress1on esu or ax R Its f T Sh ares 0 n (N Ed 011:ene1ty on ro ·t C t I) 
Variable GST(OLS) PIT (OLS) CIT(OLS) 
Intercept 20.652 -5.584 15.836 
(3.952) (2.481) (2.255) 
Political Costs GST/PIT -3.136*** 
(0.709) 
Political Costs GST/CIT 0.00077*** 
(0.000161) 
Political Costs PIT/GST -0.0919 
(0.1499) 
Political Costs PIT/CIT -0.000053 
(0.000044) 
Political Costs CIT/GST 0.1098 
(0.1461) 
Political Costs CIT/PIT -0.00046*** 
(0.000043) 
Farm -0.042 0.449*** 0.102 
(0.135) (0.083) (0.817) 
Mining 1.027*** 0.295*** -0.39*** 
(0.133) (0.084) (0.08) 
Construction -0.077 0.223*** 0.077 
(0.109) (0.068) (0.066) 
Manufacturing 0.105** 0.031 0.027 
(0.051) (0.033) (0.032) 
Transportation -0.442* 0.155 0.49*** 
(0.236) (0.148) (0.144) 
Trade 0.054 -0.052 -0.297*** 
(0.092) (0.057) (0.056) 
Finance 0.233 -0.231 ** 0.478*** 
(0.191) (0.120) (0.117) 
Population 3.43IE-7* -l.06E-7 -l.7E-7 
( l.853E-7) (I.15E-7) (-1.I IE-7) 
Prime Age l.539E-8 8.744E-9 1.419 E-8 
(2.774E-8) (1.73E-8) ( l.685E-8) 
State Personal Income PC 0.0011 -0.00976 -0.0023*** 
(0.0156) (0.00975) (0.0002) 
Expenditure PC -0.00079* -0.007 -0.0025*** 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Neighbors' Min GST Share -0.0597** 
(0.0312) 
Neighbors' Max PIT Share -0.0143 
(0.016) 




PIT Rate 0.761 *** 
(0.0665) 
CIT Rate 0.179*** 
(0.046) 
R2 .961 .988 .862 
The entnes are regression coefficients with standard errors m parenthesis. ***, **, * md1cates s1gmficance at the 0.01, 
0.05, 0. 10 confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 9.2. 
Time-Series Cross-Section Regression Results for Tax Rates 
(N E d 't C t 1) 0 n o~ene1 :y on ro 
Variable GST Rate PIT Rate CIT Rate 
Intercept 5.51 7.48 -6.21 
(1.19) (8.75) (3.34) 
Other Tax Rates I (PIT for GST rate and GST 0.005 0.388 0.097 
for income tax rates) (0.003) (0.244) (0.091) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate 0.003 -0.192** -0.023** 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.01) (0.082) (0.01) 
Lagged Shares 0.046*** 0.55*** -0.0003 
(0.004) (0.029) (0.019) 
Neighbors' Tax Rate (The Lowest for GST rate -0.01 0.010 -0.061 * 
and the Highest for inc. tax rates) (0.01) (0.038) (0.036) 
Neighbors' Expenditure -0.00005 0.00007 -0.0001 
Per Capita (0.0004) (0.00039) (0.00013) 
Home Border -0.027** -0.178* -0.0073 
Population (percent) (0.012) (0.098) (0.037) 
Neighbors' Border 0.036*** -0.42*** -0.079** 
Population (percent) (0.012) (0.1) (0.039) 
Neighbors' Border -0.03 -0.138 -0.174*** 
Income (percent) (0.024) (0. 186) (0.07) 
Home Border 0.0137 0.262** 0.1028** 
Income (percent) (0.015) (0.12) (0.04) 
House Republican (HRep) -0.018 0.308 0.096 
(0.047) (0.38) (0.146) 
Senate Republican (SRep) 0.047 -0.862** 0.471 *** 
(0.046) (0.37) (0.145) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.064** 0.548** 0.119 
(0.03) (0.24) (0.095) 
SHG Republican 0.072* -0.061 0.087 
(0.04) (0.325) (0.127) 
Median Income -0.00005*** -0.00024*** 
(6.602E-6) (0.00005) 
Households with $ 100,000 or more 0.695*** 
(0.145) 
Travel Costs 0.029* 
(0.01) 
Ri 0.951 0.960 0.786 
The entnes are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0. JO confidence levels, respectively. 
123 
Table 10.1 
Th ree-St age L s east- •< uares R egress1on esu or ax R Its t T Sh ares wit 1mean . h T' dS tate 1xe ects F" d Eff 
Variable GST (3SLS w/ TSCS) PIT (3SLS w/ TSCS) CIT(3SLS w/ TSCS) 
Intercept 36.07 18.99 12.03 
(4.31) (3.60) (2.08) 
Political Costs GST/PIT -3.27*** 
(0.75) 
Political Costs GST/CIT 0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
Political Costs PIT/GST -0.182 
(0.25) 
Political Costs PIT/CIT -0.00008 
(0.00007) 
Political Costs CIT/GST -0.114 
(0.16) 
Political Costs CIT/PIT -0.0003*** 
(0.00006) 
Farm -0.225 0.376*** 0.093 
(0.143) (0.14) (0.08) 
Mining 0.9*** -0.77** -0.422*** 
(0.144) (0.149) (0.085) 
Construction -0.19 0.53*** 0.1 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.07) 
Manufacturing 0.09* -0.172*** 0.044 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.034) 
Transportation -0.677*** 0.57** 0.409*** 
(0.27) (0.25) (0.156) 
Trade 0.059 -0.12* -0.283*** 
(0.098) (0.01) (0.06) 
Finance -0.011 -1.27*** 0.523*** 
(0.209) (0.21) (0.124) 
Population 4.9E-7*** -7.84E-8 -l.45E-7 
(l .9E-7) (2.0lE-7) (- l.2E-7) 
Prime Age l.84E-8 l.lE-8 1.86 E-8 
(2.9E-8) (2.9E-8) ( l.85E-8) 
State Personal Income PC -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 
(0.016) (0.00165) (0.0002) 
Expenditure PC -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.0025*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.01) 
Neighbors' Min GST Share -0.096** 
(0.034) 
Neighbors' Max PIT Share -0.053** 
(0.027) 




PIT Rate 0.146*** 
(0.02) 
CIT Rate -0.407*** 
(0.09) 
The entnes are regress10n coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, 0. 10 confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 10.2. 
Th ree-St age L s east- ,quares R egress1on esu ts or ax a es wit ,mean RI t T Rt "hT 
Variable GST Rate PIT Rate 
Intercept 2.45 16.54 
(0.59) (4.04) 
Other Tax Rates 1 (PIT for GST rate and GST -0.0015 -0.108 
for income tax rates) (0.003) (0.233) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate 0.061*** -0.144 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.015) (0.117) 
Lagged Shares 0.027*** 0.35*** 
(0.003) (0.025) 
Neighbors' Tax Rate (The Lowest for GST rate -0.003 0.014 
and the Highest for inc. tax rates) (0.011) (0.035) 
Neighbors' Expenditure -0.00005 0.00006 
Per Capita (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Home Border -0.044*** -0.184** 
Population (percent) (0.01) (0.088) 
Neighbors' Border 0.036*** -0.23*** 
Population (percent) (0.012) (0.09) 
Neighbors' Border -0.031 -0.012 
Income (percent) (0.024) (0.17) 
Home Border 0.029** 0.159 
Income (percent) (0.015) (0.11) 
House Republican (HRep) -0.129** -0.202 
(0.057) (0.39) 
Senate Republican (SRep) 0.007 -0.8** 
(0.016) (0.27) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.059** 0.48** 
(0.031) (0.22) 
SHG Republican 0.076*** -0.051 
(0.04) (0.26) 
Median Income -0.00004*** -0.0002*** 
(6.4E-6) (0.00004) 
Households with$ 100,000 or more 0.56*** 
(0.13) 
Travel Costs 0.0432*** 
(0.012) 
The entnes are regress10n coefficients with standard errors m parenthesis. 
***,**,*indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 confidence levels, respectively. 
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Th ree-s tage L s east- ,quares R egress1on esu ts or ax R I t T Sh ares 
Variable GST (3SLS) PIT (3SLS) 
Intercept 35.39 15.69 
(4.04) (3.62) 
Political Costs GST/PIT -6.235*** 
(1.02) 
Political Costs GST/CIT 0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
Political Costs PIT/GST 0.066 
(0.27) 
Political Costs PIT/CIT 0.002 
(0.0001) 
Political Costs CIT/GST 
Political Costs CIT/PIT 
Farm -0.302* 0.50*** 
(0.17) (0. 158) 
Mining 0.864*** -0.046 
(0.17) (0.195) 
Construction -0.11 0.093 
(0.15) (0.145) 
Manufacturing 0.014 -0.027 
(0.064) (0.062) 
Transportation -0.60** 0.37 
(0.33) (0.31) 
Trade 0.147 0.056 
(0.12) (0.111) 
Finance -0.184 -0.10 
(0.34) (0.33) 
Population 2.47E-7** -6.76E-7 
(2. l 5E-7) (2. IE-7) 
Prime Age l.052E-8 2.08E-8 
(3.0E-8) (2.82E-8) 
State Personal Income PC -0.022 -0.016 
(0.017) (0.016) 
Expenditure PC -0.0008 -0.001 ** 
(0.0005) (0.0005) 
Neighbors' Min GST Share -0.06** 
(0.031) 
Neighbors' Max PIT Share 0.Q2 
(0.026) 
Neighbors' Max CIT Share 
GSTRate 0.357 
(0.487) 
PIT Rate 0.022 
(0.045) 
CIT Rate 
The entnes are regress10n coefficients with standard errors m parenthesis. 
***,**,*indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 confidence levels, respectively. 
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Th ree-St age L t S eas - ,quares R egress1on esu or ax a es u se o a es R Its t T R t (S b t f St t ) 
Variable GSTRate PIT Rate 
Intercept 2.333 17.46 
(0.743) (5.19) 
Other Tax Rates I (PIT for GST rate and GST 0.009** 1.622*** 
for income tax rates) (0.005) (0.51) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate -0.081 ** -0.453*** 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.017) (0.139) 
Lagged Shares 0.027*** 0.143*** 
(0.004) (0.028) 
Neighbors' Tax Rate (The Lowest for GST rate -0.011 0.009 
and the Highest for inc. tax rates) (0.01) (0.041) 
Neighbors' Expenditure 0.00001 0.0005 
Per Capita (0.00005) (0.0004) 
Home Border -0.028** -0.248** 
Population (percent) (0.013) (0.102) 
Neighbors' Border 0.005 -0.321 ** 
Population (percent) (0.012) (0.10) 
Neighbors' Border -0.096*** 0.191 
Income (percent) (0.024) (0.196) 
Home Border 0.089*** 0.204 
Income (percent) (0.017) (0.14) 
House Republican (HRep) 0.151*** 0.485 
(0.05) (0.411) 
Senate Republican (SRep) 0.138** -0.316 
(0.058) (0.37) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.11 ** 0.110 
(0.03) (0.258) 
SHG Republican 0.018 0.137 
(0.04) (0.349) 
Median Income -0.00006*** -0.00009 
(7.5E-6) (0.00006) 
Households with $ 100,000 or more 0.202 
(0.24) 
Travel Costs 0.042** 
(0.014) 
The entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
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The Issues of Other Robustness Tests 
There are several important issues of the robustness tests that have not been 
addressed in the main text. These issues concern (i) the choice of a state's competitors 
and therefore the tax competition effect and (ii) the treatment of the political costs. 
i) The choice of a state's competitors and the tax competition effects 
There is no agreement in economic literature on the question of who a state's 
tax competitors are. Most state tax studies choose a selected number of states or 
"similarly situated states" for comparison purposes. The studies that choose a selected 
number of states usually include neighboring as well as non-neighboring states that share 
some similarities with the home state. For instance, for the analysis of Massachusetts' 
fiscal issues, Munnell and Browne (1990) compared the State of Massachusetts with the 
following set of states: a) other New England states; b) Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, 
New York and Pennsylvania -- a group of industrial states; c) Arizona, California, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Texas and Washington -- a group of high technology states. 
Thus, for the comparison purposes, Massachusetts' fiscal structure is compared to 
seventeen other states that are considered fiscal competitors. Similarly, Ebel's (1990) tax 
study for Nevada included sixteen competitor states: a) all the neighbors; b) Hawaii and 
Florida - like Nevada, these two states rely heavily on tourism; c) Texas and South 
Dakota - like Nevada, these two states do not levy income taxes; d) Alaska -- like 
Nevada, Alaska raises large amounts of tax revenue from one industry; e) New Jersey -
in 1990 New Jersey had a large casino industry; f) all states in the western third of the 
continental United States. 
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Given the difficulty in finding a single dimension among the competing states that 
apply to all states, the majority of state tax studies choose geographic neighbors as their 
state's competitors. Since this study examines the tax competition for the three tax 
sources, it would be impossible to come up with varying sets of competitors depending 
upon the tax source that is under consideration. In addition, given the political economy 
aspect of tax competition used by the current study, the choice of geographic neighbors 
allows for a single measure of states that apply to all United States. 
ii) Measuring the political costs to policymakers 
Many tax analysts have faced the difficulty of measuring the political costs of 
different taxes (Hettich and Winer, 1984; Landon and Ryan, 1997). Depending on the 
hypothesis about the nature of political opposition to taxation, three measures of the 
political costs have been developed by the researchers. 
a) Measures that define the political cost as opposition to the government growth 
(Hettich and Winer, 1999). In this case, the tax revenue composition depends 
upon the scale of the public sector. Therefore, in order to reflect possible scale 
effects that may influence fiscal choices, total state expenditures per capita is 
included in estimating equations. 
b) The second approach to measuring the political costs of taxation considers the 
variability of tax sources. The argument is that if tax sources are more subject to 
fluctuations, the grater political opposition can be expected. Therefore, 
policymakers chose to rely more on tax sources with less variability (Voge and 
Trost, 1979). The measures of this kind of political cost that are used by the 
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researches consist of the "year-over-year percentage change" in the tax source. 
The current study utilizes this approach to test the robustness of the political cost 
variables. The obtained results for the tax shares and tax rates are presented in 
Table 21 and Table 22, respectively. The obtained results suggest that the 
variability of the income taxes play an important role in determining the state tax 
revenue portfolio. In particular, the results suggest lower reliance on the two 
income taxes as their variability increases. 
c) The third approach assumes that the relative importance of a particular tax in tax 
portfolio depends on the size of alternative potential bases available to the 
government (Hettich and Winer, 1999). The current study follows this approach 
and defines the political costs that policymakers face as the ratios of the 
alternative tax bases. Given that the potential tax base indicates the base gross of 
exemptions and deductions, an increase in revenue from potential base implies 
larger burden for those who bear the tax. Furthermore, given the interest of the 
current study to identify the relative importance of the three taxes in tax revenue 
portfolio, the third approach of measuring the political costs of taxation has the 
most interesting implications for the tax revenue portfolios. 
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Table 13. 
Th s ree- tage L s east- ,quares R egress10n esu or ax R Its f T Sh ares e1g ors (N . hb 'A verage Sh ares ) 
Variable GST (3SLS) PIT (3SLS) CIT(3SLS) 
Intercept 30.59 26.03 9.72 
(4.56) (4.23) ( 1.88) 
Political Costs GST/PIT -3.25*** 
(0.73) 
Political Costs GST/CIT 0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
Political Costs PIT/GST -0.513 
(0.322) 
Political Costs PIT/CIT 0.00002 
(0.00009) 
Political Costs CIT/GST 0.059 
(0.16) 
Political Costs CIT/PIT -0.0004*** 
(0.00006) 
Farm -0.179 0.45*** 0.157 
(0.144) (0.18) (0.082) 
Mining 0.887*** -0.094 -0.37*** 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.083) 
Construction -0.175 0.73*** 0.073 
(0.123) (0.16) (0.067) 
Manufacturing 0.026 -0.025*** 0.032 
(0.058) (0.073) (0.033) 
Transportation -0.486 0.49 0.464*** 
(0.268) (0.32) (0.144) 
Trade -0.077 0.59 -0.29*** 
(0.097) (0.12) (0.056) 
Finance -0.535 -1.26*** 0.482*** 
(0.219) (0.28) (0.11) 
Population 5.04E-7*** -2.31E-7 -1.74E-7 
(l.9E-7) (2.5E-7) (1.13E-7) 
Prime Age 2.12E-8 -l.6E-8 l.39E-8 
(2.9E-8) (3.76E-8) (l.68E-8) 
State Personal Income PC -0.006 -0.012 -0.005 
(0.016) (0.02) (0.009) 
Expenditure PC -0.0016*** -0.0005 -0.002*** 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Neighbors' Average GST -0.0004 
Share (0.007) 
Neighbors' Average PIT 0.024** 
Share (0.021) 




PIT Rate 0.249*** 
(0.0419) 
CIT Rate 0.009 
(0.11) 
The entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0. IO confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 14. 
Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression Results for Tax Rates 
(N 'A TR ) ei~hbors verage ax ates 
Variable GSTRate PIT Rate CIT Rate 
Intercept 2.071 12.82 2.487 
(0.622) (4.54) ( 1.80) 
Other Tax Rates 1 (PIT for GST rate and GST 0.0065 0.268 0.162 
for income tax rates) (0.004) (0.34) (0.139) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate 0.047*** 0.275** 0.001 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.017) (0.132) (0.01) 
Lagged Shares 0.032*** 0.414*** -0.02 
(0.004) (0.027) (0.021) 
Neighbors' Average Tax Rates -0.051 0.183 0.043 
(Average GST, PIT & CIT rates) (0.05) (0.115) (0.068) 
Neighbors' Expenditure 0.00007 0.0002 -0.0001 
Per Capita (0.00004) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Home Border -0.039*** -0.172** -0.013 
Population (percent) (0.012) (0.09) (0.037) 
Neighbors' Border 0.039** -0.341 *** -0.09 
Population (percent) (0.01) (0.09) (0.039) 
Neighbors' Border -0.029 -0.067 -0.185** 
Income (percent) (0.025) (0.18) (0.07) 
Home Border 0.037** 0.155 0.128*** 
Income (percent) (0.016) (0.12) (0.049) 
House Republican (HRep) -0.033 0.533 0.182 
(0.05) (0.402) (0.16) 
Senate Republican (SRep) 0.021 -1.31*** 0.503 
(0.054) (0.37) (0.156) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.068** 0.392 0.089 
(0.03) (0.23) (0.097) 
SHG Republican 0.094*** -0.358 -0.125 
(0.03) (0.298) (0.11) 
Median Income -0.00004*** -0.0002*** 
(6.84E-6) (0.00005) 
Households with $ 100,000 or more 0.672*** 
(0.141) 
Travel Costs 0.045*** 
(0.013) 
The entnes are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 15. 
Th s ree- ta2e L s east- 1quares R e2ress10n esu or ax R Its f T Sh ares e1g ors ID ax (N . hb ' M" T Sh ares 
Variable GST (3SLS) PIT (3SLS) CIT(3SLS) 
Intercept 33.09 25.62 11.74 
(4.47) (3.75) (2.02) 
Political Costs GST/PIT -3.21 *** 
(0.73) 
Political Costs GST/CIT 0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
Political Costs PIT/GST -0.608** 
(0.284) 
Political Costs PIT/CIT 0.00006 
(0.00008) 
Political Costs CIT/GST -0.16 
(0.17) 
Political Costs CIT/PIT -0.0003*** 
(0.00006) 
Farm -0.185 0.41 *** 0.09 
(0. 148) (0.16) (0.08) 
Mining 0.845*** -0.008 -0.43*** 
(0. 148) (0.16) (0.086) 
Construction -0.165 0.571 *** 0.087 
(0.123) (0.142) (0.017) 
Manufacturing 0.098* -0.024*** 0.046*** 
(0.059) (0.065) (0.031) 
Transportation -0.495* 0.35 0.464*** 
(0.27) (0.28) (0.144) 
Trade -0.068 0.06 -0.30*** 
(0.097) (0.11) (0.06) 
Finance 0.016 -1.38*** 0.54*** 
(0.219) (0.24) (0.12) 
Population 5.0lE-7*** -1.68E-7 -1.63E-7 
(l.96E-7) (2.2E-7) (l.19E-7) 
Prime Age 1.52E-8 -3.29E-8 1.62E-8 
(2.94E-8) (3.29E-8) (l .78E-8) 
State Personal Income PC -0.006 -0.011 0.006 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.01) 
Expenditure PC -0.0017*** -0.0005 -0.002*** 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Neighbors' Min GST Share -0.075** 
(0.032) 
Neighbors' Min PIT Share 0.001 
(0.003) 




PIT Rate 0.215*** 
(0.038) 
CIT Rate 0.335** 
(0.109) 
The entnes are regress10n coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 confidence levels, respectively. 
140 
Table 16. 
Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression Results for Tax Rates 
(N . hb ' M" T R t ) e1e:1 ors ID ax a es 
Variable GST Rate PIT Rate 
Intercept 2.21 14.83 
(0.627) (4.33) 
Other Tax Rates I (PIT for GST rate and GST 0.010** 0.376 
for income tax rates) (0.004) (0.29) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate 0.017 0.497*** 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.018) (0.127) 
Lagged Shares 0.029*** 0.353*** 
(0.004) (0.027) 
Neighbors' Min Tax Rates -0.007 -0.0003 
(Average GST, PIT & CIT rates) (0.012) (0.045) 
Neighbors' Expenditure -0.00005 -0.0001 
Per Capita (0.00004) (0.0003) 
Home Border -0.041 *** -0.148 
Population (percent) (0.012) (0.093) 
Neighbors' Border 0.017 -0.313*** 
Population (percent) (0.026) (0.098) 
Neighbors' Border -0.029 -0.064 
Income (percent) (0.016) (0.181) 
Home Border 0.029* 0.111 
Income (percent) (0.016) (0.121) 
House Republican (HRep) -0.039 0.533 
(0.05) (0.388) 
Senate Republican (SRep) 0.068 -1.54*** 
(0.059) (0.37) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.05 0.27 
(0.03) (0.24) 
SHG Republican 0.076** -0.486* 
(0.03) (0.286) 
Median Income -0.0004*** -0.0002*** 
(6.93E-6) (0.00005) 
Households with $ 100,000 or more 0.553*** 
(0.139) 
Travel Costs 0.041 *** 
(0.013) 
The entnes are regress10n coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
































Th ree-St age L s east- ,quares R egress1on esu or ax R Its t T Sh ares e1g1 ors ax ax (N' hb 'M T Sh ares 
Variable GST (3SLS) PIT (3SLS) CIT(3SLS) 
Intercept 33.21 19.37 10.61 
(4.46) (4.32) ( 1.94) 
Political Costs GST/PIT -3. 13*** 
(0.75) 
Political Costs GST/CIT 0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
Political Costs PIT/GST -0.236 
(0.311) 
Political Costs PIT/CIT -4.12E-6 
(0.00009) 
Political Costs CIT/GST -0.04 
(0.16) 
Political Costs CIT/PIT -0.0003*** 
(0.00005) 
Farm -0.163 0.42*** 0.12 
(0.145) (0.17) (0.082) 
Mining 0.82*** -0.023 -0.42*** 
(0.142) (0.17) (0.083) 
Construction -0.151 0.72*** 0.108 
(0.124) (0.16) (0.069) 
Manufacturing 0.101* -0.022*** 0.048 
(0.057) (0.07) (0.033) 
Transportation -0.53** 0.72** 0.49*** 
(0.26) (0.30) (0.14) 
Trade -0.09 0.189 -0.30*** 
(0.098) (0.12) (0.05) 
Finance -0.031 -1.71*** 0.48*** 
(0.214) (0.26) (0.11) 
Population 4.91E-7*** -1.61E-7 -1.62E-7 
(2.0E-7) (2.4E-7) ( l.13E-7) 
Prime Age 1.52E-8 -3.29E-8 1.54E-8 
(2.94E-8) (3.29E-8) (1.7E-8) 
State Personal Income PC -0.007 -0.01 I 0.006 
(0.016) (0.02) (0.009) 
Expenditure PC -0.0016*** -0.001 *** -0.002*** 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Neighbors' Max GST Share -0.023 
(0.026) 
Neighbors' Max PIT Share 0.065** 
(0.03) 




PIT Rate 0.226*** 
(0.038) 
CIT Rate 0.198** 
(0.10) 
The entries are regress10n coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **,*indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 confidence levels, respectively. 
142 
Table 18. 
Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression Results for Tax Rates 
(N . hb ' M T R t ) e1~ ors ax ax a es 
Variable GSTRate PIT Rate 
Intercept 2.18 16.60 
(0.627) (4.34) 
Other Tax Rates I (PIT for GST rate and GST -0.004 -0.01 
for income tax rates) (0.003) (0.29) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate 0.054*** 0.117*** 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.016) (0.131) 
Lagged Shares 0.03*** 0.418*** 
(0.003) (0.027) 
Neighbors' Max Tax Rates 0.021 -0.007 
(Average GST, PIT & CIT rates) (0.029) (0.036) 
Neighbors' Expenditure -0.00002 0.0001 
Per Capita (0.00004) (0.0003) 
Home Border -0.044*** -0.198** 
Population (percent) (0.Ql2) (0.092) 
Neighbors' Border 0.03** -0.328*** 
Population (percent) (0.01) (0.097) 
Neighbors' Border -0.036 -0.033 
Income (percent) (0.024) (0.179) 
Home Border 0.034** 0.153 
Income (percent) (0.015) (0. 12) 
House Republican (HRep) -0.047 0.411 
(0.04) (0.406) 
Senate Republican (SRep) -0.028 -1.18*** 
(0.05) (0.36) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.06* 0.48** 
(0.03) (0.23) 
SHG Republican 0.06** -0.174 
(0.03) (0.286) 
Median Income -0.00005*** -0.0002*** 
(6.77E-6) (0.00005) 
Households with $ 100,000 or more 0.617*** 
(0.136) 
Travel Costs 0.047*** 
(0.013) 
The entnes are regress10n coefficients with standard errors m parenthesis. 
































Th s ree- tage L s east- ;quares R e2ress1on esu or ax R Its t T Sh ares (H ouse 
Variable GST (3SLS) PIT (3SLS) 
Intercept 35.91 18.47 
(4.36) (3.69) 
Political Costs GST/PIT -3.21 *** 
(0.75) 
Political Costs GST/CIT 0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
Political Costs PIT/GST -0.15 
(0.26) 
Political Costs PIT/CIT 0.00009 
(0.00008) 
Political Costs CIT/GST 
Political Costs CIT/PIT 
Farm -0.24* 0.37*** 
(0.14) (0.14) 
Mining 0.85*** -0.06 
(0.14) (0.15) 
Construction -0.21 * 0.59*** 
(0.12) (0.13) 
Manufacturing 0.11 ** -0.18*** 
(0.05) (0.06) 
Transportation -0.69*** 0.62*** 
(0.27) (0.26) 
Trade -0.037 0.12 
(0.09) (0.1) 
Finance -0.084 -1.33*** 
(0.21) (0.21) 
Population 4.8E-7*** -6.45E-8 
(1.9E-7) (2.06E-7) 
Prime Age 1.82E-8 -1.13E-8 
(2.9E-8) (3.03E-8) 
State Personal Income PC -0.007 -0.009 
(0.016) (0.017) 
Expenditure PC -0.001 *** -0.001 ** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
Neighbors' Min GST Share -0.095*** 
(0.03) 
Neighbors' Max PIT Share 0.036** 
(0.02) 
Neighbors' Max CIT Share 
GSTRate 0.61 *** 
(0.26) 
PIT Rate 0.16*** 
(0.03) 
CIT Rate 
The entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
***,**,*indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 confidence levels, respectively. 
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Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression Results for Tax Rates 
(H & S t J . l ) ouse ena e omt1, 
Variable GST Rate PIT Rate 
Intercept 3.54 17.39 
(0.59) (4.08) 
Other Tax Rates I (PIT for GST rate and GST -0.003 0.116 
for income tax rates) (0.003) (0.23) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate 0.037*** 0.11 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.015) (0.12) 
Lagged Shares 0.028*** 0.36*** 
(0.003) (0.02) 
Neighbors' Tax Rates (The Lowest for GST and -0.003 0.015 
the Highest for PIT & CIT rates) (0.01) (0.035) 
Neighbors' Expenditure -0.00005 -0.00002 
Per Capita (0.00004) (0.0003) 
Home Border -0.028** -0.171** 
Population (percent) (0.01 ]) (0.089) 
Neighbors' Border 0.23** -0.24*** 
Population (percent) (0.012) (0.09) 
Neighbors' Border -0.028 -0.001 
Income (percent) (0.023) (0.17) 
Home Border 0.014 0.142 
Income (percent) (0.015) (0.11) 
House & Senate Republican (HS Rep) -0.125* -0.181 
(0.05) (0.39) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.057* 0.48** 
(0.03) (0.23) 
SHG Republican 0.05* -0.09 
(0.03) (0.27) 
Median Income -0.00004*** -0.0002*** 
(6.6E-6) (0.00005) 
Households with $ 100,000 or more 0.57*** 
(0.13) 
Travel Costs 0.02* 
(0.013) 
The entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 






























Th s ree- tage L s east- iquares R egress10n esu s or ax R It i T Sh ares ew o 1bca OS aria e (N P r . I C t V . bl ) 
Variable GST (3SLS) PIT (3SLS) 
Intercept 38.88 22.46 
(4.57) (3.63) 
Political Costs GST -0.69 
(variability of GST) (0.56) 
Political Costs PIT -2.06*** 
( variability of PIT) (0.269) 
Political Costs CIT 
( variability of CIT) 
Farm -0.155 0.324** 
(0.155) (0.149) 
Mining 0.98*** -0.196 
(0.15) (0. 156) 
Construction -0.295** 0.531*** 
(0.136) (0.142) 
Manufacturing 0.083 -0.278*** 
(0.062) (0.061) 
Transportation -0.87*** 0.713*** 
(0.301) (0.264) 
Trade 0.047 0.266*** 
(0.107) (0.103) 
Finance -0.237 -1.571 *** 
(0.225) (0.224) 
Population 5.5E-7*** -2.2E-7 
(2.IE-7) (2. IE-7) 
Prime Age 1.59E-8 -3.2E-9 
(3. IE-8) (3. IE-8) 
State Personal Income PC -0.01 -0.006 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Expenditure PC -0.0018*** -0.001 *** 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
Neighbors' Max GST Share -0.113*** 
(0.037) 
Neighbors' Max PIT Share 0.063** 
(0.02) 
Neighbors' Max CIT Share 
GSTRate 1.105*** 
(0.36) 
PIT Rate 0.149*** 
(0.04) 
CIT Rate 
The entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 


































Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression Results for Tax Rates 
(New Political Cost Variable) 
Variable GSTRate PIT Rate 
Intercept 3.88 25.25 
(0.58) (4.61) 
Other Tax Rates I (PIT for GST rate and GST -0.006 -0.025 
for income tax rates) (0.004) (0.213) 
Other Tax Rates 2 (CIT rate for GST & PIT rate 0.019 0.764*** 
and PIT for CIT rate) (0.021) (0.147) 
Lagged Shares 0.026*** 0.395*** 
(0.003) (0.028) 
Neighbors' Max Tax Rates 0.003 -0.027 
(Average GST, PIT & CIT rates) (0.01) (0.038) 
Neighbors' Expenditure -0.00002 0.0005 
Per Capita (0.00004) (0.0004) 
Home Border -0.03 I*** -0.239** 
Population (percent) (0.01 I) (0.099) 
Neighbors' Border 0.018 -0.392*** 
Population (percent) (0.01 I) (0.104) 
Neighbors' Border -0.039* 0.0355 
Income (percent) (0.023) (0.193) 
Home Border 0.02** 0.179 
Income (percent) (0.015) (0.129) 
House Republican (HRep) -0.033 0.4 
(0.046) (0.393) 
Senate Republican (SRep) -0.022 -0.57 
(0.058) (0.4) 
Governor Republican (GRep) -0.067** 0.76** 
(0.03) (0.25) 
SHG Republican 0.06** 0.081 
(0.03) (0.33) 
Median Income -0.00005*** -0.0003*** 
(6.54E-6) (0.00005) 
Households with $ I 00,000 or more 0.569*** 
(0.143) 
Travel Costs 0.023*** 
(0.013) 
The entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
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